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Feature
Advancing a Framework for Regulating
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries
Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrookt
This Article looks at competing models for regulating providers of
services to individuals and businesses that take cryptocurrencies in paymentfor
goods and services, including operators of online wallets and exchanges, and
other cryptocurrency market intermediarieswhose functions resemble "money
service businesses" or "money transmission." We conclude that, in addition to
whatever "money services" or "money transmission"prudentialregulation the
States or federal government may adopt, the operation of wallets and
exchanges requires a new commercial law that lays out rights and liabilitiesof
cryptocurrency users in a robust and transparentfashion. We use Article 4A of
the Uniform Commercial Code as a model for regulating cryptocurrency
transactionsin which intermediariesplay a role.
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Introduction
The time has come to regulate the transfer of cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin by intermediaries facilitating these transfers, including operators of
online wallets, exchanges, and gateways. Transaction-execution rules for
cryptocurrency payments are the missing link in the regulation of
cryptocurrency transactions in the United States. "Default rules," such as those
commonly provided in commercial laws, obviate the necessity of negotiating
terms for each transaction and provide users of cryptocurrency payment
496

Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries
services with basic transactional rights and responsibilities, particularly in
multi-party transactions.
In the simplest, peer-to-peer bitcoin transaction,' the sender's
cryptographic credentials are used to sign the transfer, which is recorded on the
master public ledger and can be verified by other users. 2 Such transactions are
referred to as taking place "on the block chain." 3 A growing percentage of
transactions, however, take place through one or more intermediaries.
Intermediaries act as custodians of cryptocurrency or cryptocurrency
credentials originally belonging to their clients and may facilitate and clear
transactions for clients without updating the public ledger. Such transactions
are referred to as taking place "off the block chain." Off the block chain
transactions may not appear in the public ledger at all, or, if they do, they

t
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1.
CRAIG K. ELWELL, M. MAUREEN MURPHY, & MICHAEL V, SEITZ[NGER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R 43339, BITCOtN QUESTIONS, ANSWERS AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES, at

SUMMARY (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf.
2.
See Franqois R. Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, CHI. FED. LETTER, no. 317, Dec. 2013, at
2-3 [hereinafter Bitcoin Primer]. For additional insights into how Bitcoin works, see Sarah Meiklejohn
et al., A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names, IMC '13
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT 10-13 (2013), available at
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2504730.2504747 [hereinafter Fistful of Bitcoins].
3.
Bitcoin Primer, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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appear as transactions involving not the sender and receiver, but the
intermediaries.
Intermediaries to cryptocurrency transactions act much like intermediaries
to transactions in traditional payment systems. They pose similar types of credit
and liquidity risks to consumers, market participants, and national economies.
The increasing prevalence of intermediaries in cryptocurrency transactions
necessitates regulation of these new market participants. In contemplating that
regulation, it seems logical to look at regulations governing existing payment
mechanisms to start a discussion of when and how to regulate cryptocurrencies.
This Feature article reviews the existing forms of regulations in the United
States (and to a limited extent in other nations) that could be adapted to regulate
the rights and duties of third-party market participants such as online wallets
and exchanges engaging in transfers of cryptocurrencies. It then describes the
features that any framework for regulating market participants using
cryptocurrencies to make payments should include.
Crafting the right, first-stage regulation of any new technology is a
daunting task. It will be unclear, possibly for some time, whether it is worth
spending public and private resources on a technology that may never gain
widespread acceptance. This difficulty may explain our legislators' and
regulators' habits of allowing new technologies, particularly those involving
financial innovations, to operate in unregulated spaces until a significant
problem arises.
In the universe of virtual currencies and cryptocurrencies, a significant
problem with a new technology hit the headlines in early 2014. The Mt. Gox
Bitcoin exchange in Japan suspended transactions in February 20144 and
subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan.' Approximately $650
million of Bitcoin value allegedly vanished.6
In the United States, individual states became more actively engaged in
efforts to regulate cryptocurrencies around that time.7 These efforts, however,
have been primarily reactive to whatever crisis is in the news and the
immediate costs associated with it. As such, legislators and regulators may fail

4.

See Alex Hem, Bitcoin Exchange MtGox Offline Amid Rumors of Theft, GUARDIAN

(Feb. 25, 2014, 5:06 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/25/bitcoin-exchangemtgox-offline-amid-rumours-of-theft [hereinafter Hem, Mt. Gox Offline].
5.

See Alex Hem, MtGox Files for Bankruptcy in Japan After Collapse of Bitcoin

Exchange, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28
/bitcoin-mtgox-bankruptcy-japan [hereinafter Hem, Mt. Gox Bankruptcy Filing].
6.

Shivam Srivastava & Marja Novak, Bitcoin Exchange Bitstamp Suspends Service

After Security Breach, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2015, 8:58 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/06/usbitstamp-cybersecurity-idUSKBNOKFOUH20150106 (reporting that Bitstamp, based in Slovenia,
announced that the breach would affect a "small fraction of its total Bitcoin" holdings and that it would

honor its Bitcoin account holders in full) [hereinafter Bitstamp Breach].
7.
For discussion of state efforts responding to virtual currencies, see text
accompanying notes 89 to 98, infra.
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to regulate new technologies in a manner that protects users, preserves utility,
and enables future innovation.
On the other hand, by offering basic rules, early regulation can aid those
innovators by removing complex questions about whether a certain law applies
to a new product as well as the risk of law enforcement actions if the innovator
fails to comply with a law that is applicable. It also can reduce transactional
costs among counterparties and externalities. In setting forth a vision for
governing cryptocurrency payment transactions by intermediaries, our goals are
to foster innovation and, accordingly, to encourage adoption of these
technologies by adding to transactional certainty.
We are not alone in suggesting that regulation of new payments
technologies may add to those technologies' perceived legitimacy and spur
faster adoption for some purposes. For example, one commentator argued that
Coinbase's opening as the first licensed exchange in the United States could
bring "needed legitimacy to [Bitcoin], which isn't backed by a central
government and is traded over virtual exchanges, primarily overseas." 8 Other
proponents of (some) regulation have voiced their views.9
One can argue that, in the infancy of three-party credit cards in the 1970s
(and subsequently of debit cards), federal regulation provided transparent
protections for users and may have aided consumer adoption of innovative new
services and products.' 0 Regulation also can provide signals of legitimacy for
bankers and investors whose attention is required both to get products and
services to market and to reap the rewards that new technologies offer." It
enables these actors to measure the new product against a standard of behavior.
This being said, promoters of new technologies have expressed concerns
that inappropriate government constraints could destroy nascent industries.
These views are common among commentators on cryptocurrencies.1 2
When regulation comes early in the development of a new technology,
missteps may occur. Too much regulation can cause regulatory arbitrage8.
See Greg Bensinger, Bitcoin Exchange to Open in U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2015,
at C5 (reporting on receipt by the Coinbase exchange of financial support from USAA Bank, the New
York Stock Exchange and others) [hereinafter Bensinger].
9.
E.g., Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation
in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REv. 271 (2015) (urging a focus on policy goals in development of
comprehensive, cohesive and scaled virtual currency regulation); Daniela Sonderegger, Note, A
Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of Regulation, 47 WASH. U. J.L. POL'Y

175 (2015); Patrick Kirby, Virtually Possible: How to Strengthen Bitcoin Regulation Within the Current
Regulatory Framework, 93 N.C. L. REv. 189, 220 (2014) (arguing that regulators can add certainty and
legitimacy to the use of bitcoins).
10. E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (2013) (provisions also
known as the Fair Credit Billing Act), and Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-169 3 r
(2013).
11.
Bensinger, supranote 8.
12. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, New York's New Bitcoin Rules Are Going to Kill Its
Startups, WIRED (July 17, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/nybitcoin/; Tim Worstall, It Could Be
the Bureaucrats That Kill Bitcoin, FORBES (May 16, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall

/2013/05/16/it-could-be-the-bureaucrats-that-kill-bitcoin/.
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movements of developers to less regulated channels or jurisdictions, 3 which
may not be the optimal spaces for the technology to prosper. On the other hand,
failure to regulate technology that is designed to compete with existing
products and services may cause other market distortions. Failure to regulate
prudentially or to offer rules for multi-party transfers also may delay adoption
of the new technology by a significant number of users. Adoptions are key to
producing revenue streams from those users whose transactions generate
revenue streams and attract investments needed to finance the next generation
of developments.
The regulation of cryptocurrencies up through late 2014. in the United
States focused on public purposes such as tax collection, the deterrence of
money laundering, economic sanctions laws, unregistered securities offerings,
and commodities transactions with cryptocurrencies as the underlying asset.
One example is the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") guidance on the threshold requirements for
certain intermediaries in cryptocurrency transactions to register as "money
service businesses."1 4 In another example of this type of public-purposes
regulation, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") stated that the receipt of
convertible cryptocurrencies through a process known as "mining,"' 5 and
subsequent transfers of cryptocurrencies in payment for goods and services
give rise to gains or losses depending on whether the property "received in
exchange exceeds the taxpayer's adjusted basis of the virtual currency."' 6 The
IRS's designation of cryptocurrencies as "property" instead of as "currency"
deprives the trader/user of favorable tax treatment afforded to foreign currency
transactions and forces the taxpayer to track his or her "basis" in each unit of
currency upon the sale or exchange and, to calculate any net gain or loss
realized. 17
Part I of this Article briefly explains what "cryptocurrencies" (also known
as math-based currencies) are and how they operate.

13.

See Frank Partnoy, FinancialDerivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage,

22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997) (defining regulatory arbitrage as "those financial transactions designed
specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by different regulations or laws"). For
a more recent discussion of regulatory arbitrage in a somewhat broader context, see Annelise Riles,

Managing Regulatory Arbitrage:A Conflict ofLaws Approach, 47 CORNELL L. REV. 63 (2014).
14.
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2013G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN's REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR
USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-

GOOI.pdf [hereinafter 2013 FinCEN Guidance] (clarifying the coverage of regulations that implement
the federal Bank Secrecy Act to persons engaged, among other things, in the receipt, distribution,
exchange, and transmittal of virtual currencies).
15.
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-PeerElectronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG

4, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last accessed Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Nakamoto] (explaining the
analogy to "gold miners"). For additional discussion of the process and rewards of "mining" of Bitcoin,
see Bitcoin Primer,supra note 2, at 2.

16.
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21 (Apr. 14, 2014), at Frequently Asked Questions 3, 4 & 6,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n- 14-21 .pdf [hereinafter 2014 IRS Guidance].
17.
Id. at Frequently Asked Questions 1, 2 & 3.
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Part II's first sub-part provides background on the regulation of virtual
currencies in the United States up through the end of 2014, focusing on the five
major developments over the past two years that demonstrate the types of
regulatory actions being taken. These developments include the two mentioned
above: the March 2013 guidance by FinCEN on virtual currencies issued,' 8 and
the IRS' position that virtual currencies are taxable as property, not currency.' 9
The remaining three include: (1) the first comprehensive licensing and
supervision scheme for regulating virtual currency businesses and market
participants-originally proposed by the New York State Department of
Financial Services in July 2014 (the "BitLicense" proposal) 20 and adopted in
June 2015 with minor changes (the "BitLicense Final Regulations");21 (2) the
December 2014 Conference of State Bank Supervisors' Policy on Virtual
Currency Regulation and Draft Model Regulatory Framework; 22 and (3) the
December 2014 Report from the Uniform Law Commission's Study
Committee on Alternative and Mobile Payments. 23 These documents will frame
the first steps in cryptocurrency regulation in the United States.
The second sub-part of Part II describes steps taken by other national
governments relating to the regulation of virtual currencies. No other nation has
yet moved towards regulating cryptocurrency transaction execution, a vital step
toward growth of cryptocurrencies in payments and toward maintaining level
playing fields between traditional payments systems operators and their
cryptocurrency competitors.
In Part III, we review existing regulation schemes in the United States that
could be brought to bear upon cryptocurrency payments or on cryptocurrencies
as commodities. We look at various rationales for regulation, including the
aforementioned regulation for primarily public-law purposes such as collecting
taxes or deterring money laundering. A second rationale for regulations such as
those applicable to commodities and securities markets is that these types of

18.
2013 FinCEN Guidance, supra note 14.
19.
2014 IRS Guidance, supranote 16, at 2.
20.
Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses, 36 N.Y. Reg. 14 (July
23, 2014), http://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/register/2014/july23/pdf/rulemaking.pdf [hereinafter BitLicense
Proposal]. For additional information on the 2014 proposal, see Press Release, N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Serv.,
NY DFS Releases Proposed BitLicense Regulatory Framework for Virtual Currency Finns (July 17,
2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press20l4/prl407171.html [hereinafter BitLicense Press Release].
21.
Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses, 37 N.Y. Reg. 7 (June
24, 2015) (to be codified at N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, pt. 200), http://docs.dos.ny.gov/info
/register/2015/june24/pdf/rulemaking.pdf [hereinafter BitLicense Final Regulation].
22.

CSBS Policy on Virtual Currency Regulation, CONF. OF ST. BANK SUPERVISORS

(Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/ep/Documents/CSBS%20Policy%20on%20State
%20Virtual%20Currency%20Regulation%20--%2ODec.%2016%202014.pdf
[hereinafter
CSBS
Framework]. The Policy document focuses on areas such as consumer protection, market stability, and
law enforcement goals, and also makes recommendations on covered activities, policy implementation,

and possible exclusions. Id. at 2-3.
23.
UNIF. LAW COMM'N, FINAL STUDY COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE AND MOBILE
PAYMENTS REPORT, Dec. 19, 2014 (copy on file with authors and with the editors of the Yale Journal on
Regulation) [hereinafter ULC STUDY COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT].
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regulations contribute to transparent and well-functioning marketplaces. They
enhance the accountability of market participants and market-makers and
protect users. Market-enhancing regulation may include mandatory licensure
or registration, prudential requirements such as minimum capital standards and
periodic inspections, and other types of supervision. One of the potential
benefits from this type of regulation is that users can identify entities that have
passed muster with regulators. This creates a kind of trust for these entities. 24
Trust diminishes issuers' and market-makers' costs to attract new customers,
and also reduces users' search costs.
Other forms of regulation more specifically serve private-law purposes by,
for example, establishing default rules among counterparties to certain kinds of
transactions. Default rules apply in the absence of negotiated contracts or when
negotiated contracts are silent on the issue in question. This type of regulation
allocates risks, rights, and duties to counterparties. Although many of the
provisions in such sets of default rules may be modifiable by the parties, default
rules also reduce transaction costs and externalities and contribute some trust
effects to marketplaces, which enable counterparties to know what to expect
from each other. This is true even absent separately negotiated contracts. In the
United States, we have varied levels of these default rules, including provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 2 5
We submit that cryptocurrency payment intermediaries should be subject
to this last type of regulation: private-law, default-rule regulations available to
other payment transaction-execution participants. As cryptocurrency wallets,
exchanges, and gateways proliferate inside the United States and position
themselves as substitutes for legacy intermediaries in the banking and non-bank
money transmitter industries, these intermediaries place themselves in
competition with traditional "trusted intermediaries" that cryptocurrencies were
designed to do away with, at least in part. 26 As intermediaries, the terms and
conditions on which they offer transaction execution and value-storage services
to others should be transparent and enforceable. Such intermediaries are
accountable to their customers for performing the payments instructions sent by
customers faithfully and in a timely manner. Transparent and enforceable rules
for counterparties in cryptocurrency payments and storage services will
contribute to trust in the entity, which will enable it to compete with other
providers of similar transaction-execution and value-storage services. This
trusted status, in turn, should allow the market for these services to grow.
Other classes of regulation combine features of the public-law, privatelaw, or market-enhancing purposes we have mentioned above. For example, the
CSBS Framework, supra note 22.
24.
See, e.g,. U.C.C. arts. 3, 4, 4A passim; Collection of Checks and Other Items by
25.
Federal Reserve Banks and Funds Transfers through Fedwire (Regulation J), 12 C.F.R. pt. 210 (2013).
26.
See Nakamoto, supra note 15, at I (observing that Bitcoin could replace trusted
intermediaries in payments). For additional information about the trusted intermediary in payments
transactions, see CSBS Framework, supranote 22.
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requirements that certain cryptocurrency market participants register with
FinCEN as "money services businesses" 27 or obtain licenses from states as
"money transmitters" and remain in compliance with state requirements serve,
respectively, some public-law and some market-enhancing purposes.
In Part III, we also offer some analysis of the New York State Department
of Financial Services BitLicense regulation that will require licensure in order
to engage in New York or with a "New York Resident" in what the BitLicense
defines as "virtual-currency business activity. "28
Parts IV and V outline a framework for regulating payment transaction
execution by cryptocurrency intermediaries in both consumer- and merchantside transactions, as well as rules applicable to executing instructions. to
intermediaries to exchange cryptocurrency for fiat currency. Our framework
proceeds from Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code, which regulates
wholesale wire transfers, for basic concepts of verifying transactions and
allocating risks and responsibilities, and from the federal Electronic Fund
Transfer Act for some "consumer protection" concepts.
The Conclusion offers a few principles that we hope will guide the
development of the various new regulations that will be developed for
cryptocurrency market participants.
I. What Are Cryptocurrencies?
Discussions of emerging payment mechanisms are frequently hampered
by ambiguities in terminology that can lead to confusion. For purposes of this
article, we will use the term "currency" to mean the legal tender of a particular
nation or group of nations. Examples of currencies include the U.S. dollar,
Australian dollar, euro, Philippine peso and Russian ruble. "Legal tender," in
turn, refers to a form of national money lawfully established by the government
to serve as a medium of payment of taxes and used for commercial exchange.2 9
Counterparties are required by law to take the legal tender of their jurisdiction
as payment for the discharge of debts or releases of securities, and, more
commonly today, as modes of payment for transactions in goods and services.
It is no surprise that disputes over a sovereign's ability to designate new forms
of "legal tender" have occurred throughout history-from the days of Queen
Elizabeth's rule over Ireland," to the question of President Lincoln's ability to

27.
28.

2013 FinCEN Guidance, supra note 14.
BitLicense Final regulation, supra note 21,

29.

BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (10th ed. 2014).

§ 200. 2 (g),

(h), (q).

30.
See The Case of Mixed Money (1605) 80 Eng. Rep. 507 (P.C.) (upholding the
right of Elizabeth I of England to devalue the currency, as she had in 1601, even if it caused great
suffering among the people of Ireland), translatedin JOHN DAVIES, A REPORT OF CASES AND MATTERS
IN LAW: RESOLVED AND ADJUDGED IN THE KING'S COURTS OF IRELAND [1604-1612], at 48 (1762).

The most famous sentence in the opinion proclaimed: "[Ilt appertaineth only to the [K]ing of England,
to make or coin money within his dominions..." Id. at 51. Since The Case of Mixed Money, three
attributes of "money" and of "legal tender" that distinguish them from other forms of exchange have
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introduce paper legal tender in the United States during the Civil War,3 1to the
recent debate over the use of Scottish banknotes in England and Wales. 32
Indeed, frustration with government control of and perceived manipulation of
existing flat currency values was one of the drivers for the creation of Bitcoin. 33
We use the term "virtual currency" to refer to a medium of exchange
existing entirely in intangible form that is not legal tender but which can
substitute for legal tender. Older forms of "currency" that are not "legal
tender" include paper-based currency substitutes, such as military scrip and
depression scrip.34 In recent times, the term "virtual currency" has developed
an added connotation that it exists only in an electronic or digital form and is
used only as a medium of exchange between members of an online or virtual
currency community. 35 Virtual currencies may be used for online games, social
media, or corporate loyalty programs to purchase virtual goods or redeem
prizes. 36

A subset of virtual currency is "cryptocurrency," by which we mean an
internet-based virtual currency in which the ownership of a particular unit of
value is validated using cryptography.37 Cryptocurrencies are not legal tender"
and, thus, their use requires the consent of both parties to a transaction. They

been acknowledged: "the authority of the prince, the stamp, and the value"-that is, the sovereign, its
stamp designating the "thing" as money or legal tender, and the sovereign's power to set the value for
purposes of commerce and foreign exchange. Id. at 52.

31.
See The Legal Tender Acts, 12 Stat. 345 (Feb. 25, 1862), 12 Stat. 532 (July 11,
1862), 12 Stat. 709 (Mar. 3, 1863). The constitutionality of these acts, which authorized the federal
government to issue paper currency called "treasury notes" or "greenbacks" was the subject of numerous
decisions of the Supreme Court. Among them were Knox v. Lee & Parker v. Davis ("The Legal Tender

Cases"), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870) (overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869)
(finding no express authority in the Constitution to make notes or bills of credit as opposed to coining
"legal tender" for payment of debts).
32.
See Severin Carrell, Scottish Banknotes: the Treasury's Symbolic Hostage in the
Independence Debate, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics

/scottish-independence-blog/2013/apr/22/scottish-independence-banknotes (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).
33.
The economic theory underlying cryptocurrency stems from the Austrian school of
economics and its critique of central bank intervention in support of government issued fiat currency.
See EUR. CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 22-23 (2012) [hereinafter ECB REPORT].
Keynesian economists question whether cryptocurrency can serve as a long-term store of value or

whether it is merely a bubble. See Paul Krugman, Bitcoin is Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2013,
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/bitcoin-is-evil/.
34.
See generally Loren Gatch, Local Money in the United States During the Great
Depression, 26 ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY 47 (2008). For additional discussion, see

Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, A HistoricalAnalysis of Substitutesfor Legal Tender
and Their Implications for the Regulation of Virtual Currency, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW (John A. Rothchild ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2016).
35.

See, e.g., ECB REPORT, supra note 33, at 13 (defining virtual currency as "a type

of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its developers, and used and
accepted among the members of a specific virtual community").

36.

Id. at 13-16.

See Bitcoin Primer,supra note 2, at 2.
37.
38.
The Canadian government experimented with but abandoned the idea of issuing a
cryptocurrency that would have "legal tender" status. See David George-Cosh, Canada Puts Halt to
MintChip Plans, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/canadarealtime/2014/04/04/canadaputs-halt-to-mintchip-plans-could-sell-digital-currency-program/.
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are not denominated in or backed by gold or silver. Economists call currencies
backed by precious metals and the like "commodity-based currencies." 39 We
note that a cryptocurrency given the status of "legal tender" by a government
would qualify as "fiat currency" under the BitLicense Final Regulation40 and
would appear to fall outside its definition of "Virtual Currency." 4 1 That would
send persons who transmit cryptocurrency back to the realm of more traditional
"money transmitter" regulation.
Bitcoin is the best-known cryptocurrency. Bitcoin have no physical
presence and their ownership is verified not by possession but by entries in a
massive database known as the "block chain," which is maintained over a peerto-peer network.4 2 Transactions between a sender and receiver are "signed"
using the participants' cryptographic credentials ("keys") and sent to the
network for validation.4 3 If the network validates the key "signatures," then the
block chain is updated to reflect the transaction.44 There is no central authority
that validates the transactions; instead, the block chain is maintained by a group
of volunteers referred to as "miners" who are periodically rewarded for their
service by receiving newly created bitcoin.4 5 The Bitcoin protocol allows the
supply of the cryptocurrency to expand slowly over time until it reaches a limit
of 21 million bitcoin. 46 A senior Federal Reserve Bank economist refers to
bitcoin as a "fiduciary currency," because bitcoin have "no intrinsic value, and
they derive their value in exchanges either from government fiat or from the
belief that they may be accepted by someone else."4 7
A number of variations on the Bitcoin protocol, referred to as "altcoins,"
have been implemented, each trying to improve on the protocol by changing
how coins are generated, modifying the size of the money supply, or fixing
other perceived flaws. 48 As a June 2014 report issued by the Clearing House
and Independent Community Bankers of America noted, "establishing firm
definitions is a challenge" as these new altcoin variations continue to emerge. 49

39.

Bitcoin Primer, supra note 2, at 2-3.

40.

Compare BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21,

§

200.2(d) (definition of

"fiat currency"), with § 200.2(m) (definition of "virtual currency"). As defined, it appears that the two
terms are intended to be mutually exclusive.

41.

BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21,

§ 200.2(p).

42.
See ECB REPORT, supra note 33, at 21. For additional information, see Bitcoin
Primer, supra note 2 at 2-3.
43.
ECB REPORT, supra note 33, at 23. For additional discussion of the validation
process, see Bitcoin Primer, supra note 2, at 2.

44.
45.
46.

Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24-25.

Bitcoin Primer,supra note 2, at 2-3.
47.
48.
See Comparison of Cryptocurrencies,BITCOIN WIKI (updated as of Sept. 2, 2014
at 22:53), https:/len.bitcoin.it/wiki/Listof altemativecryptocurrencies (listing "altcoins" that have
market caps of more than SI million or that have become notorious for some reason).

49.
The Clearing House & Independent Cmty. of Bankers of America, Virtual
Currency: Risks and Regulation, ICBA.ORG, June 23, 2014, http://www.icba.org/files/ICBAsites
/PDFs/virtualcurrencywhitePaperJune20l4.pdf [hereinafter Clearing House/ICBA Report].
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Although the virtual currencies in the market place each have unique
characteristics, there remain ways of categorizing these products intelligibly for
the purposes of regulation. The first attribute relates to whether a virtual
currency has a centralized or decentralized administrative structure. As noted
above, Bitcoin is a decentralized scheme lacking a single authority and instead
relying on the "miners" to maintain its administrative records.50 Because there
is no entity issuing or backing bitcoin, there is no place a holder of bitcoin may
turn to redeem his or her holdings. 5 ' This is in contrast to underlying virtual
currencies in online games like World of Warcraft or Second Life for which the
company that provides the game administers the virtual currency, sets the rules
for when and how it may be purchased and at what price.52
The second attribute relates to whether a virtual currency can be
exchanged for legal tender either with the issuer or on a virtual currency
exchange. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies can be bought and sold in return
This "convertibility"
for legal tender currencies on a number of exchanges.
contrasts with virtual currencies in most on-line games where the system is
"closed" and the virtual currency may be spent within the game, but cannot be
"converted" back to dollars or other legal tender currencies. 54 The one
exception, however, is Second Life, which allows users to sell their in-game
currency for real money.55
These attributes are summarized below:
Taxonomy of Virtual Currencies

Centralized

Decentralized

Convertible

e-Gold, Liberty Reserve,
Second Life Linden Dollars

Bitcoin, altcoins

Nonconvertible

World of Warcraft Gold and
other in-game currencies,
loyalty
rewards,
airline
reward points

This taxonomy that divides virtual currencies into centralized/
decentralized and convertible/nonconvertible is a fundamental tool in how
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50.

ECB REPORT, supra note 33, at 24-25.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 25-6.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 29.
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regulators decide to treat individual financial products. The distinctions played
a key role in FinCEN's 2013 Guidance on Bank Secrecy Act compliance for
virtual currency market participants, which defined and focused on
"convertible" virtual currencies. 56 The distinctions were also instrumental in the
Financial Action Task Force's 2013 assessment of the money laundering risks
posed by virtual currencies, which set forth definitions of "convertible" and
non-convertible" virtual currencies.s5
II. How Are Cryptocurrencies Regulated Today?
A. Regulation by the United States FederalGovernment and the States
Before 2013, neither the federal government nor the states had issued
regulatory guidance over cryptocurrencies, their issuers, or the exchanges that
facilitate their transfer. Since March 2013, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury (through FinCEN and the IRS) and several States have taken or begun
actions to regulate cryptocurrencies. By the spring of 2013, they also took other
actions against cryptocurrency market participants that we discuss below.
B. Actions by the FederalGovernment
The first federal regulatory guidance dealing with cryptocurrencies was
FinCEN's March 2013 Guidance describing compliance obligations under the
federal Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA") 58 for certain participants in cryptocurrency
transactions. 59 That Guidance distinguished between "convertible" and "non-

56.

2013 FinCEN Guidance, supra note 14, at 1, 4-5. This guidance proceeds from

prior FinCEN guidance and regulations involving "money transmitters" and the issuance and sale of

"prepaid access." See Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to
Money Services Businesses (the "MSB Rule"), 76 Fed. Reg. 43,585 (July 21, 2011); Final RuleDefinitions and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,403 (July 29, 2011).
57.
For a comprehensive discussion of distinctions among types of crypto- and virtual
currencies, see FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL

AML/CFT RISKS 4-8 (June 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/medialfatf/documents/reports/Virtualcurrency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf. The report explains that "convertible" virtual
currencies need not enjoy an "ex officio convertibility (e.g. in the case of a gold standard), but rather a
de facto convertibility (e.g. because a market exists)." Id. at 4. Non-convertible currencies "cannot be
exchanged for fiat currency." Id.

58.
Bank Secrecy Act, tit. I-II, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1114-24 (1970)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-59; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-14, 5316-32 (2012))
(authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations requiring organizations deemed to be
"financial institutions" to keep records and file certain reports as the Secretary of the Treasury deems to
have a "high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, . . . or in
the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence analysis, including analysis to protect against

terrorism" (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)(A) (2012); 31 C.F.R.
FinCEN's BSA regulations].
59.
2013 FinCEN Guidance, supra note 14.

§§

1000-1099 (2013))) [hereinafter
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convertible" virtual currencies 60 and between those with a central administrator
and those without one.61
After that guidance, the Department of Homeland Security in May 2013
seized assets owned by a Bitcoin exchange based in Japan and one of its
subsidiaries. 62 The Department's seizure warrant was directed at Dwolla, an
Iowa-based Internet payments company, ordering the seizure and forfeiture of
an account held in the name of Mutum Sigillum, LLC.63 The federal agent's
affidavit that the Department filed in support of the seizure warrant described
Mutum Sigillum as a U.S.-based subsidiary of the Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange.64
The affidavit cited transactions in which a confidential informant had used U.S.
dollars to purchase and exchange Bitcoin for U.S. dollars through Mutum
Sigillum and Dwolla accounts. 65 These transactions supported the
Department's claim that Mutum Sigillum was engaged in money transfers but
had failed to register with FinCEN pursuant to the March 2013 Guidance and
31 U.S.C. § 5330.66
Following these developments, the question arose of whether or when
Congress or federal government agencies might regulate virtual currencies for
other purposes, including in connection with securities offerings and
commodities transactions, and in consumer transactions. In November 2013,
the Senate Committees on Homeland Security and Banking and Urban Affairs
held hearings, respectively on national security and terrorist-financing
concerns, 67 and on the need for regulation of cryptocurrencies with some
attention to consumer protection and anti-money-laundering concerns.68

60.
61.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.

62.
See Joe Mullin, Feds Seize Money from Dwolla Account Belonging to Top Bitcoin
Exchange Mt. Gox, ARS TECHNICA (May 14, 2013, 5:55 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013
/05/feds-seize-money-from-top-bitcoin-exchange-mt-gox/ [hereinafter Mullin]. For more discussion,
see Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Virtual Uncertainty: Developments in the Law of
ElectronicPayments and FinancialServices, 69 BUs. LAW. 263, 264 (2013).
63.
Seizure Warrant at 1, In re Seizure of the Contents of One Dwolla Account, No.

13-l162-SKG (D. Md. May 14, 2014), http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Mt-GoxDwolla-Warrant-5-14-13.pdf [hereinafter Seizure Warrant].
supra note 62.

For additional information, see Mullin,

64.
Jordan Maglich, Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox files for bankruptcy, FORBES (Feb. 28,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanmaglich/2014/02/28/bitcoin-exchange-mt-gox-files-forbankruptcy [hereinafter Maglich].
65.

Seizure Warrant, supra note 63, at 1. Affidavit in Support of Seizure Warrant at 3,

In re Seizure of the Contents of One Dwolla Account, No. 13-1162-SKG (D. Md. May 14, 2013),
available

at

http://cdn.arstehcnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Mt-Gox-Dwolla-Warrant-5-14-

13.pdf [hereinafter Affidavit in Support of Seizure Warrant]. For additional information, see Mullin,
supra note 62.
66.
Affidavit in Support of Seizure Warrant, supranote 65, at 2.
67.
Beyond Silk Road: PotentialRisks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies,
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 113th Cong. (2013), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov
/hearings/beyond-silk-road-potential-risks-threats-and-promises-of-virtual-currencies.
68.
The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency: National Security and
International Trade and Finance, Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs,
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In February 2014, the Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange suspended operations
and subsequently collapsed.69 Mt. Gox later filed for bankruptcy protection in
Japan 70 and commenced an ancillary proceeding in Texas under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code's Chapter 15.n' A class action lawsuit was filed against Mt.
Gox in the Northern District of Illinois. 72
At roughly the same time, states began to determine whether and how to
regulate cryptocurrencies when the Conference of State Bank Supervisorsn and
the Uniform Law Commission 74 created new projects aimed at studying the
need for forms of cryptocurrency regulations.
Federal agencies moved cautiously with no plans to embark on a
systematic regulatory scheme for cryptocurrencies. In late February 2014, the
chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System testified that the
Board "lacked authority to supervise or regulate Bitcoin in any way." 75 Other
federal agencies were not silent on or shy about how cryptocurrencies fit into
various regulations in force. For example, in January 2014, FinCEN issued
additional regulatory guidance on virtual currencies, clarifying that "mining"
itself-that is the receipt of cryptocurrency as a reward for maintaining the block
chain76-was not "money transmission" n and, thus, clarified its own 2013
Guidance.78 In April 2014, the IRS announced it would treat Bitcoin as
"property" (not as foreign currency) for purposes of recognizing ordinary
income and capital gains under the Internal Revenue Code.79 In May 2014, the

113th Cong. (2013), http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&

HearingID=955322cc-d648-4a00-a41f-c23be8ff4cad. One of the authors was a witness at this hearing.
69.
70.

See Maglich, supra note 64, at 1.
See Hern, Mt. Gox Bankruptcy Filing, supra note 5.

71.
See In re Mt. Gox Co., No. 14-31229 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 10, 2014).
72.
Class Action Complaint at ¶J 47, 81, 128, 135, Greene v. Mt. Gox Inc., No. 1401437 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2014).
73.
74.

CSBS Framework, supranote 22.
Press Release, Unif. Law Comm'n, New ULC Study and Drafting Committees to

be Appointed (Jan. 28, 2014).
75.
See Dominic Rushe, Federal Reserve has no authority to regulate Bilcoin,
GUARDIAN, Feb. 27, 2014, www.theguardian.com/business/2014/feb/27/janet-yellen-federal-reserve-noauthority-regulate-bitcoin (reporting on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress by the

Hon. Janet L. Yellen, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the United
States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and particularly her answers to
questions on the Board's authority to regulate Bitcoin).
76.
See Bitcoin Primer,supra note 2, at 2-3.
77.
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-RO1,
APPLICATION OF FINCEN's REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY MINING OPERATIONS (2014),

http://www.fincen.gov/news room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-ROO 1.pdf [hereinafter Fin-2014-RO I]; FIN.
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-R002, APPLICATION OF
FINCEN"s REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND CERTAIN
INVESTMENT ACTIVITY (2014), http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/rulings/pdflFIN-2014-R002.pdf

[hereinafter "Fin-2014-R002"]. For more discussion of how a Bitcoin is mined, see generally Bitcoin
Primer,supra note 6 at 2.

78.
79.

See 2013 FinCEN Guidance, supra note 14, at 2.
2014 IRS Guidance, supra note 16.
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Securities and Exchange Commission issued an investor alert8 o and announced
an enforcement action against an offeror of unregistered Bitcoin-related
securities.s8

The calls for regulation increased. On June 23, 2014, the Clearing House
Association and Independent Community Bankers Association published a
study entitled "Virtual Currency: Risks and Regulation," which was designed
to "promote consideration of how existing regulatory regimes in the United
States may be applied to virtual currency, virtual currency system participants
and products, and virtual currency transactions. 82 On June 26, 2014, the
Government Accountability Office released a report responding to a request
from Senator Tom Carper, Chair, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs.83 That report called for, among other things, more
involvement by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB").8 4 It also
offered a useful pr6cis of actions taken by other federal agencies related to
cryptocurrencies generally.85 Then, in August 2014, the CFPB issued a
consumer alert describing various risks posed by virtual currencies. 86 In
December 2014 the CFPB issued a proposed rule modifying the regulation of
prepaid accounts which the Bureau acknowledged "may have potential
application to virtual currency." 87
On December 10, 2014, the Chair of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry that the CFTC considered virtual
currencies trading as commodities to be covered by its jurisdiction. He further

80.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INVESTOR ALERT: BITCOIN AND OTHER VIRTUAL
CURRENCY-RELATED INVESTMENTS (May 7, 2014), http://investor.gov/print/4536.
81.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC-2014-ll l, SEC CHARGES BITCOIN
ENTREPRENEUR WITH OFFERING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, (Jun. 3, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News

/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541972520. A prior SEC enforcement action alleging violations
of the antifraud and registration requirements occurred in 2013. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Shavers, No.
413-CV-418 (E.D. Texas Aug. 6, 2013). Charges included operating a Ponzi scheme.
82.
Clearing House/ICBA Report, supra note 49, at 4.
83.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-496, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES
EMERGING REGULATORY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION CHALLENGES 1 (2014)

[hereinafter GAO-14-496]. This report also compares the operations and tax consequences of virtual
currencies such as Bitcoin that can be used outside virtual economies with those such as Linden dollars
that can be used only within virtual economies, such as Second Life. Id. at 9. It also follows the GAO's
2013 study of virtual economy and currency taxation issues. U.S. GOv'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES AND CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE

TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654620.pdf [hereinafter GAO- 13-516].
84.
GAO-14-496, supra note 83, at 37-40 (describing interagency task forces working
on virtual currency issues, but noting the absence or limited involvement of the CFPB on those task
forces).

85.

Id. at 24-37.

86.

CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, RISKS TO CONSUMER POSED BY VIRTUAL

CURRENCIES (Aug. 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408 cfpb consumer-advisory_virtualcurrencies.pdf [hereinafter CFPB 2014 Virtual Currency Advisory].
87.

Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the

Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 79 Fed. Reg. 77,102, 77,121 (proposed Dec. 23, 2014) (noting that
CFPB's review of virtual currencies and related products is "ongoing").
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testified that the CFTC had approved a registration to trade virtual currencies as
In other words, the CFTC's authority to regulate
commodities.88
cryptocurrencies relates to the trading of cryptocurrencies as commodities, and
does not extend to regulation of cryptocurrency market participants whose
business involves execution of payments transactions, such as through online
wallets and exchanges.
C. Actions by the States
Most states have now taken positions on virtual currencies by issuing
consumer and investor alerts based on or reiterating work by the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors and the North American Securities Administrators
Association. 89 State regulators are actively policing investment schemes related
to virtual currencies, taking action against a company that solicited oil and gas
investments in bitcoin, 90 and sanctioning a deceptive investment pool seeking
investors to fund the development of new bitcoin mining equipment. 91
On July 17, 2014, the New York State Department of Financial Services
jolted the virtual currency community by proposing a comprehensive regulation
that would require virtual currency participants to obtain what the state called a
"BitLicense." 92 The proposed regulations unleashed a fury of commentary,
both informal postings 93 and formal public comments. 94 As noted above, the

88.
The Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n-Effective Enforcement and the Future
of Derivatives Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry, 113' Cong. 62
(2014) (statement of Timothy Massad, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n) [hereinafter

Massad 2014 Senate Testimony], http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg94366/pdf/CHRG1 13shrg94366.pdf.
89.
Conference of State Bank Supervisors & N. Am. Sec. Admin. Ass'n, Model State
Consumerand Investor Guidance on Virtual Currency, CSBS.ORG (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.csbs.org
/legislative/testimony/documents/modelconsumerguidance--virtual %20currencies.pdf.

90.

In re Balanced Energy, LLC, ENF-14-CDO-1731 (Tex. Sec, Bd., 2014); see also

Joe Mont, Texas Becomes First State to Halt a Bitcoin Investment Deal, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Mar. 12,
2014), http://www.complianceweek.cornblogs/enforcement-action/texas-becomes-first-state-to-halt-a-

bitcoin-investment-deal.
91.
In re Virtual Mining Corp., Case No. AP-14-09 (Mo. Sec'y of State 2014),
http://www.sos.mo.gov/securities/orders/ap-14-09.pdf;

see also Press Release, Mo. Sec'y of State,

Kander Halts Deceptive Bitcoin Scheme in Springfield (June 2, 2014), http://www.sos.mo.gov/securities
/mipc/newsrelease.asp?nlD= 1394.
Bitlicense Proposal, supra note 20.
92.
93.
See, e.g., Erik Voorhees, Reflection on the NYDFS BitLicense Proposaland the
Right of Privacy, MONEY AND STATE, (July 18, 2014), http://moneyandstate.com/reflections-right-

privacy-response-nydfs-bitcoin-proposal; Tone Vays, Top 5 Issues with the NYSDFS BitLicense
Proposal, COINTELEGRAPH (July 24, 2014 11:18 PM) (containing links to three additional
commentaries on the BitLicense proposal); Ryan Selkis, Bitcoin at a Crossroads - tackling the

Bitlicense, COINTELEGRAPH (July 20, 2014 4:15 PM), http://cointelegraph.com/news/1 12104/bitcoin-ata-crossroads-tackling-the-bitlicense (dividing aspects of the proposed BitLicense into "the good, the
bad, and the ugly").
94.
For a complete listing of the 3,746 public comments on the BitLicense proposal,
see Comments Regarding the Proposed Virtual Currency Regulatory Framework, N.Y. DEP'T FIN. SERV

(2014), dfs.ny.gov/legal/vcrf-comments.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
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final BitLicense regulations were published on June 24, 2015.95 We discuss key
features of the final BitLicense regulation in Part III of the article.
Between July 2014 and June 2015, both California and North Carolina
considered changes to their money transmission licensing requirements to bring
virtual currencies under their respective regimes. 96 Because both states'
legislation was pending as we completed editing of this article, we do not
discuss these bills in depth in this article. New York State also granted in May
2015 what appears to be the first trust company charter in the nation to the itBit
Trust Company. 97 The charter allows itBit to offer custodian services for
customers' assets, including bitcoin and U.S. dollars, but it does not allow itBit
to function as a full-fledged commercial bank.98
D. Regulation in Other Nations
When one looks outside the United States, one finds only limited
regulation of cryptocurrencies. Some countries-China, 99 Iceland, 00 the
Russian Federation,101 and Thailandl 02 -- have issued edicts effectively
prohibiting the use of Bitcoin for payment purposes in their domestic markets.
Other nations have focused on regulating cryptocurrencies only for limited
purposes. 0 3 For example, some countries have dealt with the taxation issues
associated with virtual currencies,104 and some have announced their plans to

95.
96.

BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21.
H.R. 289, 2015 Sess. (N.C. 2015) (defining "money transmission" to include

"maintaining control of virtual currency on behalf of others" and allowing licensees to hold as
"permissible investments . . . [v]irtual currency owned by the licensee, but only to the extent of

outstanding transmission obligations received by the licensee in like-kind virtual currency"), available
at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/Bills/House/PDF/H289vl.pdf.
For analysis of this bill, see
North Carolina Bill Defines Bitcoin as "Permissible Investment," COINFOX.COM (May 22, 2015),

http://www.coinfox.info/news/2085-north-carolina-bill-defines-bitcoin-as-permissible-investment.
See
also A.B. 1326, 2015-16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (last amended Jun. 1, 2015) (extending licensing
requirements to persons or entities developing virtual currency network software or providing data

storage or cyber security services for licensed businesses), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces
/billNavClient.xhtml?bill id=201520160ABl326.
97.

2015

See Questions from the Community: itBit's Trust Charter, ITBIT.COM (May 18,

1:30 PM), www.itbit.com/blog/questions-from-the-community-itbits-trust-charter (providing a

splendid chart comparing the operational differences between the trust company charter, the BitLicense,
and a traditional money transmitter license).

98.

See id.

99.
Virtual Currencies: International Actions and Regulations, PERKINS COIE, http://
www.perkinscoie.com/virtual-currencies-intemational-actions-and-regulations [hereinafter Perkins Coie
Virtual Currencies Report] (last updated June 2015) (containing a chart showing actions by many
national governments). The report is updated periodically.

100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.

103.
See GLOBAL LEGAL RES. DIRECTORATE STAFF, REGULATION OF BITCOIN IN
SELECTED JURISDICTIONS (2014), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/
(hereinafter Global
Research Center 2014 Report); Perkins Coie Virtual Currency Report, supra note 99.

104.
Germany).
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regulate virtual currencies as commodities,' 05 or as exchange. 106 Governments
have issued warnings about the risks of using virtual currencies, 0 7 and have
announced their intentions to apply existing anti-money-laundering laws and
reporting to virtual currency transactions. 08 The predominant existing
regulations around the world, however, focus on taxation and frameworks to
thwart the use of cryptocurrencies.' 09 As far as we have been able to find, only
the Swiss government has announced its intention not to regulate Bitcoin. 110
Canada's federal government is the exception to this pattern of limited
regulation of cryptocurrencies. Canada is the only national government so far to
amend its anti-money-laundering and terrorist financing statute specifically to
cover cryptocurrencies."' The June 19, 2014 amendments to Canada's
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act cover four
main subject areas: (1) regulating those dealing in digital currencies as money
service businesses, so that they are subject to record keeping, verification
procedures, suspicious transaction reporting, and registration requirements; (2)
requiring registration with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis
Centre of Canada ("FINTRAC," which is Canada's equivalent to the U.S.
Department of the Treasury's FinCEN) and implementation of a full-dress antimoney laundering compliance program; (3) covering all foreign digital
currency money service businesses that market to Canada as well as those
inside Canada (but exempting businesses providing services only outside
Canada for external services only); and (4) prohibiting banks from opening
accounts for digital currency money services businesses if they are not
registered with FINTRAC." 2 The term "dealing in virtual currencies" was not
defined. As recently as June 2015, a report prepared for the Senate Committee

105.
106.
107.

Id. (e.g. Finland and Germany).
Id. (e.g. Netherlands).
Id. (e.g. Argentina, Belgium, and Brazil).

108.

See, e.g., Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act,

S.C. 2000, c. 17 (Can.), amended by S.C. 2014, c. C-31 (Can.), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P24.501 .pdf; Perkins Coie Virtual Currency Report, supra note 99 (Czech Republic).
109.
See Global Research Center 2014 Report, supra note 103 passim; Perkins Coie
Virtual Currency Report, supra note 99.
110.
Swiss Government to Refrain from Bitcoin Regulation, COINBRIEF (June 13,

2015), http://coinbrief.net/swiss-bitcoin-regulation (describing study conducted by Swiss National Bank
and the government's Federal Council that led to the conclusion not to regulate Bitcoin "for the
present," and noting that any victims of Bitcoin problems were "already protected by Swiss law")

111.
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000,
c. 17 (Can.), amended by S.C. 2014, c. C-31 (Can.). See Christine Duhaime, Canada Implements
World's First National Digital Currency Law; Regulates New Financial Technology Transactions,
DUHAIME LAW (July 2014), http://www.duhaimelaw.com/2014/06/22/canada-implements-worlds-firstnational-bitcoin-law.
112.
See FIN. TRANSACTIONS & REPORTS ANALYSIS CTR. OF CAN., FINTRAC
ADVISORY REGARDING MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES DEALING IN VIRTUAL CURRENCY (July 30,
2014), http://www.canafe-fintrac.gc.ca/new-neuf/avs/2014-07-30-eng.asp. See also Duhaime, supra note
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on Banking, Trade and Commerce recommended both monitoring and "a light
regulatory touch-almost a hands off approach." 13
As of the mid-point of 2015, it remains unclear whether other national
governments outside the United States and Canada will see a need to take
additional steps to regulate cryptocurrencies or regulate cryptocurrency market
participants engaged in commodities or securities brokering or intermediaries
engaged in transaction execution of value storage. Not all national governments
apparently are persuaded that cryptocurrencies will mature into full-fledged
competitors for existing legal tender or payment systems,' 1 4or that they will
survive future price volatility,115 operations suspensions,' 16 or losses.117
Beyond individual nation-states, other groups are working on assessing
the risks and benefits of cryptocurrencies. In what is perhaps the most extensive
report on the regulatory risks and needs of virtual currencies to date outside the
United States and Canada, the European Banking Authority ("EBA") published
its "Opinion on 'virtual currencies"' in July 2014.'18 The Opinion identifies
multiple risk factors that may affect virtual currency market participants"' and
lays out a "proposed regulatory approach," 2 o including an "immediate
regulatory response for the short term," 1 2 1 and a "rationale for a consistent
regulatory response across the EU."1 2 2 The Opinion specifies risks to users,
non-user market participants, financial integrity, payments systems and
providers whose businesses involve fiat currencies, and risks to regulatory

113.
STANDING S. COMM. ON BANKING, TRADE & COMMERCE, DIGITAL CURRENCY:
YOU CAN'T FLIP THIS COIN (Can. 2015), http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/banc/rep

/repl2junl5-e.pdf.
114.

See, e.g., Jerin Mathew, Japan's Finance Minister Taro Aso Says He Thought

Bitcoin 'Won't Last Long', INT'L BuS. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014, 10:53 AM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk
/japans-finance-minister-taro-aso-says-he-thought-bitcoin-wont-last-long-1438312.
115.

BITCOIN PRICE INDEX CHART, COINDESK.COM, http://coindesk.com (last visited

May 31, 2015) (showing price fluctuations since May 31, 2014 from more than $600 per bitcoin to less
than $200 briefly in January 2015 to $232.60 at 1 pm on May 31, 2015; trading over week prior to May
31, 2015 ranged from $232.60 to $241.19).
116.
E.g., Kim LaChance Sandrow, Bitcoin Exchange Bitstamp Suspends Operations
Following Hack, ENTREPENEUR.COM (Jan. 5, 2015, 5:15 PM), http://www.entrepeneur.com/article

/241432 (last visited May 31, 2015); Louis Goddard, Bitcoin Exchange BitFloor Suspends Operations
After $250,000 Theft, THEVERGE.COM (Sept. 5, 2012, 07:12 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/9/5
/3293375/bitfloor-bitcoin-exchange-suspends-operations-after-$250,000-theft
(last visited May 29,
2015) [hereinafter Goddard].
117.
Cameron Keng, Bitcoin's Mt. Gox Goes Offline, Loses $409 Million -- Recovery
Steps and Taking Your Tax Losses, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2014, 4:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/cameronkeng/2014/02/25/bitcoins-mt-gox-shuts-down-loses4O9200000-dollars-recovery-steps-andtaking-your-tax-losses/; Goddard, supra note 116 at 1.
118.
EUR. BANKING AUTH., EBA OPINION ON 'VIRTUAL CURRENCIES,' (Jul. 4, 2014),

[hereinafter EBA 2014 Opinion], https://www.eba.europa.euldocuments/10180/657547 /EBA-Op-201408+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf.
119.
Id. at 5-6, 21-37.
120.
Id. at 38-45.
121.
Id. at 43-44.
122.
Id. at 45-46.

514

Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries
authorities.1 23 It also articulates features of both the "immediate regulatory
response" and some longer-term goals. 124
Focusing on the EBA's recommendations for the intermediate response,
the Opinion advances a series of specific goals that have much in common with
the state of regulatory play in the United States and uses regulatory models
similar to those we use to explain our own thoughts on what needs to be
addressed inside the United States in the near-term. Among the risks addressed
by the Opinion are:
- Losses and theft of virtual currencies,
- Large-scale money laundering or criminal activity facilitated by virtual
currency exchanges,
- Damage to conventional payment systems and payment system
operators, and
- Risks to individual users of virtual currencies. 2 5
The intermediate solutions to these issues involve (1) creating a
requirement that any entity participating in the virtual currency market be "a
legal person"l26 and be "responsible for maintaining the integrity of the central
transaction ledger, the protocol, and any other core functional component of the
scheme," and meet "regulatory and supervisory requirements" imposed by the
overall regulatory system created;1 27 (2) recommending that virtual currency
exchanges be subjected to the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing provisions of the 2005 EU Anti Money Laundering Directive,' 2 8
which would make them "subject to its anti-money laundering and counter
terrorist financing requirements"' 29 and impose requirements like the
"customer-identification-program
requirements"' 30 of FinCEN's AML
regulations;131 (3) "shielding regulated financial services from" virtual currency
schemes and "mitigat[ing]. . . risks that arise from the interaction between
[virtual currency] schemes and regulated financial services";' 32 and (4)

123.
Id. at 21-37.
124.
Id. at 44-46.
125.
Id. 1 177, at 44.
126.
Id. 159, at 40.
127.
Id. 154, at 39.
128.
Directive 2005/60, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October
2005 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing, http://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32005LOO60. Readers
should note that the EBA 2014 Opinion uses the term "obliged entities," which does not appear in this
Directive.

129.
130.
131.

EBA 2014 Opinion, supra note 118, at 6,¶178, at 44.
Id. 1156, at 40.
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R.

132.

EBA 2014 Opinion, supra note 118, ¶ 177, at 44.

ch. X (2015).
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adopting measures that are designed to protect individual users, including
liquidity requirements,1 33 accountability to regulators,' 34 and documentation
requirements.1 35
The mixture of public and private legal purposes, along with measures
that can be used to maintain the functions of virtual currency market
participants (through transparency, corporate governance, sufficient capital
reserves and liquidity for the scope of the entity's operations), effectively align
with the regulatory models we discuss in Part III of this article. In Part III.A,
we look at other regulatory regimes in the United States whose coverage bears
on cryptocurrency market participants in one form or another. The 2014
BitLicense proposal described in Part III.B of this article and the final 2015
BitLicense regulation focus on the prudential regulatory needs we mention
throughout this article.
We move beyond other regulatory regimes in Part V to suggest a
framework of "commercial law" rules. Among the reasons we recommend
development of commercial law "default rules" is the goal of promoting
uniformity and certainty in transactions among counterparties and in
interpretations by courts. In our view, commercial law rules mitigate risks to
individual users that are different from those addressed by prudential regulation
and corporation laws. Commercial laws set forth rights and duties of persons
who use intermediaries in payments or value-conversion transactions. Part V
outlines some key features we would consider appropriate for a commercial
law to cover.
III. Which Existing Regulatory Schemes Might Help Us Model a Regulatory
Approach to Cryptocurrency Intermediaries?
Financial products that share at least some attributes with cryptocurrencies
already exist and are already regulated. Policymakers considering whether and
how to regulate a new industry may start by looking at how current law treats
analogous products. In this Part, we describe the regulatory models that we
think are more likely to influence regulators looking at cryptocurrency. These
descriptions are not meant to convey a complete synopsis of each model, but
rather to focus on high-level policy objectives of each and highlight salient
differences among the models.
In Part III.A, we look at the regulatory models that already apply to some
products and services with which cryptocurrencies might compete. These
models, which we described briefly in the Introduction, address: (1) public-law
purposes (such as prevention and detection of money laundering or of tax

133.
134.
135.
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evasion); (2) purposes related to market-efficiency, transparency and
accountability; and (3) default rules for transaction-execution purposes.
In Part III.B, we look in somewhat greater depth at the New York State
Department of Financial Services' BitLicense regulation and the 2014 proposal
from which it emerged. The Final Regulation employs components of several
of the models we have suggested in Part III.A. We explain our concerns about
New York's approach. Among these are our concerns that the BitLicense
imposes more onerous prudential regulatory requirements on cryptocurrency
intermediaries than New York State imposes on legacy providers whose epayment products and services are provided via the internet (including those
that states license and supervise as "money transmitters").
A. Regulatory Models that Apply to Products and Services with Which
CryptocurrenciesMay Compete
1. Payment Systems
The most obvious model for regulating cryptocurrency market
participants-including miners managing the block chain but also all of the
users and intermediaries who facilitate payments using cryptocurrencies-is as
a payment system. The term "payment system" refers to an operational network
that is governed by laws, rules and standards and that links bank accounts,
providing the functionality for monetary exchange using bank deposits.' 3 6 The
term also includes "the infrastructure (comprised of institutions, instruments,
rules, procedures, standards, and technical means) established to effect the
transfer of monetary value between parties discharging mutual obligations." Its
technical efficiency determines the efficiency with which transaction money is
used in the economy and the risk associated with its use.' 37
Payment systems are highly regulated in the United States because they
typically involve more than two participants and also involve both credit and
liquidity risks of intermediaries whose participation is required to complete the
payment transaction from end to end. Beyond the prospect of a consumer user
of cryptocurrencies in payments for goods and services having no transparent,
end-to-end regulatory scheme by which to measure the execution of the
payment transaction, we submit that it is an error to allow some participants in
payments transactions to operate with no transparency and little accountability.
The difference in operating costs between a regulated payments system

136.

See PAYMENT SYSTEMS: DESIGN, GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT 3 (Bruce J.

Summers, ed., Central Banking Publications Ltd, London, 2012).
137.
See Biago Bossone & Massimo Cirasino, The Oversight of the Payment Systems:
A Frameworkfor the Development and Governance of Payment Systems in Emerging Economies,
wORLD BANK 7 (July 2001), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer

/WDSP/IB/2007/03/02/000310607_20070302132738/RenderedlPDF/3882700versight0oftipaymentsOI
PUBLIC .pdf.
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provider and an unregulated provider would give a substantial cost advantage
to the unregulated provider. Consumer users may or may not appreciate the
divergence in the risks to their own transactions. Participants in the larger field
of payment systems should not have to compete with unregulated actors while
being burdened with the costs of being regulated entities. This view is not
motivated by a desire to protect legacy payment systems (a field in which one
of us works) from unregulated competition but to ensure that lay users enjoy
protections comparable to protections that other payment systems are required
to offer.
Despite the fact that participants in Bitcoin-denominated transactions
follow the Bitcoin protocol and that the protocol has a small number of basic
rules, Bitcoin itself is not a payment system.138 A bitcoin holder, or a person
having both the public and private keys for a bitcoin or fraction of a bitcoin,
may be able to make a person-to-person ("P2P") or person-to-business ("P2B")
transfer of the bitcoin's value without the assistance of a trusted intermediary,
including a financial institution.1 39 This transfer of ownership rights to a new
owner is the equivalent of handing cash or a chattel to another in payment of an
obligation or as a gift. Bitcoin are units of value storage or of account, and the
systems of drawing against "deposits" of Bitcoin in the various online wallets,
competing exchanges, and merchant processing service providers are closer to
"payment systems." On the other hand, some cryptocurrency systems are
intended to operate as payment systems, that is, they are operational networks
governed by rules and standards that link accounts to use and transfer value
between those accounts.1 40 For example, Ripple is a payment system.141
Payment system "rules" and operating standards in the United States are
found in: (1) statutes such as the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Actl 42 and
Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code enacted by the states,1 4 3 which
govern wholesale and retail electronic transfers involving bank accounts, (2)
federal regulations such as the Federal Reserve Regulation E'" that governs
consumer electronic transfers involving bank accounts and prepaid cards, or (3)
system rules such as those developed by organizations such as NACHA, the

138.

See, e.g., Nakamoto, supra note 15, at 1-2 (explaining how the block chain works

without a trusted intermediary).
139.
Id. at 1 (Abstract); Bitcoin Primer, supra note 2, at 2-3.

140.
Nakamoto, supra note 15, at 1; Bitcoin Primer, supra note 2, at 2-3.
141.
How Ripple Works, RIPPLECOM (Oct. 14, 2014), https://ripple.com/knowledge
center/how-ripple-works [hereinafter "How Ripple Works"]. Of particular note is discussion of how
Ripple helps users avoid counterparty risk otherwise present when intermediaries such as banks
participate in transactions.

142.
143.
144.
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Clearing House Interbank Payments System ("CHIPS"),145 Visal 4 6 and
MasterCard. 147
Statutory schemes and the regulations that implement them-such as the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act and its companion Regulation E mentioned
above-and some payment system rules in the United States may provide for
consumer protections against fraud and error. Visal 48 and MasterCard,1 4 9 for
example, both have policies that protect cardholders from liability for most
unauthorized transactions. The Visa and MasterCard system rules supplement
the longstanding federal Regulation E's consumer protection requirements for
disclosures,' 50 procedures for error resolution,5 1 and limitations on consumer
liability for unauthorized transfers. 1 52 The Bitcoin protocol does not address
these issues.
Statutes and system rules also prescribe rules for payment transactions to
assist counterparty and particularly multiple-party transactions. For example,
the U.C.C's Article 4A, enacted in every state,1 53 contains provisions that spell
out when payments occur, 154 when obligations are discharged by payment,155
and the consequences of payments made late or otherwise improperly
executed.' 56 Article 4A established a set of private-law default rules that govern
all or part of transactions not specifically covered by contract or system rules.
Default rules facilitate transactions and establish trust for transaction
participants. Most of the default rules can be varied by agreement of the parties
to the transaction or by system rules that apply to some or all of the parties to
the transaction.
Regulation of electronic consumer payment systems at the federal level in
the United States requires, for example, upfront disclosure of costs, as both the
Truth in Lending Act157 and Regulation E's provisions on cross-border

145.
Clearing House Interbank Payments System Rules and Administrative
Procedures, THE CLEARING HOUSE (Mar. 2013), https://www.chips.org/financials/operations/rulesDocs

/073219.pdf.
146.

Visa International Operating Regulations, VISA (2013), https://usa.visa.com

/download/merchants/visa-intemational-operating-regulations-main.pdf
147.
MasterCard Rules, MASTERCARD (2014),

http://www.mastercard.com/us

/merchant/pdf/BM-EntireManual_public.pdf.
148.

Zero

Liability,

VISA

U.S.A.,

http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/zero-

liabilityjsp (last visited on Oct. 8, 2014).
149.

MasterCardZero Liability Protection, MASTERCARD, http://www.mastercard.us

/zero-liability.html (last visited on Oct. 8, 2014).
150.
12 C.F.R §§ 1005.4 & 1005.7 (2014).
151.
Id. § 1005.11.
Id. § 1005.6.
152.
153.

See UCC Article 4A, Funds Transfers (1989), UNIF. LAW COMM'N, http://

www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%204A,%20Funds%20Transfers%20(1989)
visited Aug. 30, 2015).
154.
U.C.C. § 4A-401 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012).
Id. § 4A- 406(b).
155.
156.
Id. §§ 4A-303 to -305.
157.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1631(a), 1632(a) & (c) (2012 & Supp. 2013).
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remittance transfers do. 58 Federal laws also set forth minimum procedures for
making claims of execution errors (delays, delivery to a recipient not intended
by the initiator of the payment, duplicate payments, and the like).
Other important features of traditional payment system regulation,
whether based on statutes or system rules, relate to transaction execution and
implied warranties that persons or institutions participating in the payments
flow either meet certain behavioral standards or will be responsible for the
consequences of their failure to do so. These implied warranties favor other
participants in the transaction-or series of transactions-that may be required
to complete the transfer. For example, U.C.C. Article 4A prescribes liability for
certain transaction execution errors, such as delivery to the wrong
beneficiary5 9 or late delivery of the funds. 6 o U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 impose
implied warranties on transferors of notes, drafts and checks,'61 and on those
who present them for payment.' 62 At the federal level, subpart C of Federal
Reserve Board Regulation "CC,"l63 which implements the Check Clearing for
the 21st Century Act,164 imposes implied warranty obligations on
counterparties otherwise subject to their provisions.' 6 5 Rules allocating liability
for transmission errors and imposing warranty obligations would be similarly
useful for cryptocurrencies.
A set of rules for cryptocurrency payment transactions need not cover
every transaction to be effective generally. For example, payment methods can
benefit from the establishment of clear parameters for when the particular set of
rules applies and does not apply. Certain payment rules provide exemptions for
de minimis activities or players. For instance, Regulation E does not apply to
those cross-border remittance transfers under $15166 or to entities that provide
one hundred or fewer remittance transfers a year.' 67 Persons or entities
operating below these levels are not expected to comply with the regulation.1 68
Given that hefty compliance costs may attend participation in regulated
payment systems, a de minimis exemption for similarly low-volume or lowvalue transactions might make sense for online wallet or exchange operations.
The U.C.C. payments provisions-Articles 3, 4 and 4A-each have provisions

Id. § 1693o-1(a)(2) (disclosure required).
158.
159.
U.C.C. § 4A-303 to -304.
160.
Id. § 4A-305.
161.
Id. §§ 3-416, 4-207.
162.
Id. §§ 3-417, 4-208.
163.
12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2014).
164.
12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018 (2012).
165.
12 C.F.R. § 229.34, .38, .52 (2014).
Id. § 1005.30(e)(2)(i) (definition of "remittance transfer").
166.
167.
Id. § 1005.30(f)(2)(i) (definition of "remittance transfer provider").
168.
See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 50,244 (Aug. 20,
2012) (discussion of "safe harbor" created by sections 1005.30(e)(2)(i) and 1005.30(f)(2)(1)).
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explaining the nature of the transactions they govern.1 69 In the case of Article
4A, coverage depends on whether the bank that has received an instruction to
pay (called a "payment order") has agreed to handle it, a status referred to as
"acceptance." Before executing the payment order, the bank will have verified
it using security procedures adopted by agreement with its customer as required
by the provisions of Section 4A-201,'1 7 0 and will have agreed to handle the
payment order, which is signified by "acceptance" of the customer's payment
order. 171
No existing or proposed regulation of cryptocurrencies in the United
States so far offers rules that are comparable to these more established payment
system rules in terms of determining their coverage, requiring disclosures,
managing transaction execution, or dealing with errors or disputes in
transactions or transfers. Thus, they do not provide rules that make
cryptocurrency market participants function with the same degree of
transparency and accountability to their counterparties or provide users with
means of obtaining remedies when the transaction is not completed pursuant to
instructions that traditional payment system statutes, regulations, or rules do. A
comparable situation existed prior to the enactment by the states of U.C.C.
Article 4A when wholesale wire transfers were governed by bilateral contracts
for the most part and participants lacked end-to-end rules governing
transfers.1 72

2. Money Services Businesses and Money Transmission
Non-depository providers of services that receive and/or transmit money
on behalf of customers are regulated by the states,1 73 with additional federal
regulations dealing with specified actors and their respective anti-moneylaundering measures, 74 economic sanctions compliance,17 5 and record keeping

§§

169.
U.C.C. §§ 3-102, 4-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002); U.C.C.
4A-102, -104(a), -108 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012).
U.C.C. § 4A-201.
170.
171.
Id. § 4A-209.

172.

U.C.C. Art. 4A, Pref. Note, iii and

§ 4A-507

(2012). For additional information

on the operation of wholesale wire transfers and the rights and duties of participants, see Raj Bhala,
Legal Foundations of Large Value-Transfer Systems, in THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: DESIGN,
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 53, 63 & n. 52-53 (Bruce J. Summers, ed., 1998).
173.
See State-by-State Regulation, THE NAT'L MONEY TRANSMITTERS ASS'N,
http://www.nmta.us/state-by-state-regulation (last visited Dec. 27, 2014) (useful summary of manner in
which states regulate licensing and operation of money services businesses and money transmitters as

businesses).
174.

See generally 31 C.F.R. ch. X (2014) (setting out anti-money-laundering

requirements for various entities that meet the definition of "financial institution" under 31 U.S.C.
5311-5330 (2012 & Supp. 2013)).

175.

See, e.g., id.

§

§§

560.530(a)(3) (requirements for special licenses for transactions

with Iran). For a comprehensive listing of OFAC regulations and guidance pertinent to Iran, see Iran
Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, www.treasury.gov/resources-center/sanctions/Programs

?pages/Iran.aspx (last visited May 28, 2015).
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and reporting requirements. 176 In this subsection, we briefly discuss the most
significant federal and state statutes and regulations that currently apply to
cryptocurrency market participants such as online wallets and exchanges. We
do not take positions on whether existing federal or state laws are good laws;
we instead present them as illustrations of the various means by which the
federal government and the states have regulated aspects of these types of
businesses and operators to date.
Money-service-business and money-transmitter prudential regulatory
schemes straddle the public-law and market-enhancing models we outlined
above. Crafting prudential regulations of cryptocurrency intermediaries as
money service businesses or money transmitters is part of the larger scheme of
regulations needed to create the trust that we think cryptocurrencies will need
to gain wider acceptance, but it is not the focus of this Article.
a. Federal Laws that Apply to Money Services Businesses and
Money Transmission.
The Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
("FinCEN") requires entities operating as "money services businesses"
("MSBs"), including currency exchanges and money transmitters, to register
with FinCEN,1" establish a risk-based anti-money laundering program,7 7 and
maintain certain records and file certain reports.1 79 FinCEN's MSB registration
regulations do not have prudential supervision or other prescriptive provisions.
MSB regulations apply to traditional, brick-and-mortar check cashers,
remittance transfer companies such as Western Union and MoneyGram, and
others.

80

FinCEN's 2013 Guidance identifies participants in certain cryptocurrency
schemes as "money transmitters" for purposes of its MSB regulations and
requires their compliance with its MSB registration requirements.181 The
agency explained that the regulatory definition of "money transmission"
includes the transmission of "currency, funds, or other value that substitutesfor

176.
See Agency Collection Activities; Comment Request; Renewal without Change
of Bank Secrecy Act Recordkeeping Requirements, 79 Fed. Reg. 30,928 (May 29, 2014) (summary of
record-keeping and recording requirements imposed under 31 C.F.R. ch. X).

177.
178.

31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2014).
Id. § 1022.210(a), (b), (d) (describing, respectively, requirements to develop,

implement and maintain AML programs, to ensure that the program is "commensurate with the risks

posed by the location and size of, and the nature and volume of the financial services" provided by the
MSB, and to set forth minimum elements of the AML program).
179.
See generally id. §§ 1022.300-.380 (reports to be made by money service
businesses), .400-.410 (records to be maintained by money service businesses).

180.
See id. § 1010.100(d) (exclusion of banks and persons regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission), .100(ff) (coverage only
if "activity threshold" for money service business greater than $ 1,000 per day in one or more transfers;
no threshold for money transmitters' coverage), .100(t) (definition of "financial institution").

181.
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currency" and thus reaches the transfer of money substitutes such as
cryptocurrencies.182

FinCEN later limited the reach of its 2013 Guidance by clarifying that an
entity is not an MSB if it merely "mines" Bitcoin by solving the algorithms for
which the Bitcoin protocol offers Bitcoins, pays for goods and services with it,
or converts Bitcoin into legal tender.' 83 The agency also has advised that the
production and distribution of software to manage Bitcoin holdings is not
"money transmission," even if the software facilitates the purchase and sale of
crypto-currency.1 84 It is possible that a market participant in cryptocurrencies
will have registration requirements under FinCEN's guidance, a circumstance
that would allow FinCEN to track the participant's compliance with federal
anti-money laundering, tax reporting and economic sanctions statutes and
regulations, but might not have to obtain a license from any state as a "money
transmitter" or "money service business," a situation we describe below. As the
states decide how they want to regulate cryptocurrency wallets and exchanges,
more wallet and exchange providers may have to comply with state as well as
federal requirements.
b. State Laws Regulating Money Transmitters, Money Service
Businesses, and their Receipt and Transfers of Money
Prudential regulation of money transmitters and other MSBs remains the
province of the states. States have established robust licensure programs,' 85
require background checks on principal owners and officers, set bonding/
security and minimum capitalization requirements,1 86 dictate or require
regulations on the types of permissible investments,' 87 and authorize on-going
review of financial statements.' 88 Generally, money transmitters are required to
maintain the amount of funds they are holding for senders based on transaction
volume.' 89 Like provisions that underlie federal bank "deposit insurance"

182.

Id. at 2-3 (citing 31 C.F.R.

§ 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A)

(2014)) (emphasis added).

183.
Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Virtual Currency Mining Operations,
FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK 2-3 (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.fincen.gov/news room/rp/rulings/pdf

/FIN-2014-R001.pdf.

For additional information on how Bitcoin, for example, are mined, see Bitcoin

Primer, supranote 2, at 2.

184.
185.
186.

FIN-2014-R002, supra note 77, at 2.
E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.030 (2013).
E.g., id. § 19.230.050, .060 (surety bond/security requirements; net worth

requirements).

E.g., id. § 19.230.200-.210.
187.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1900 (2014) (defining "money transmission" and
188.
"money transmitter"); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.010(17)-(19) (2013) (defining "money services,"
"money transmission," and "money transmitter"). For a comprehensive listing of state "money
transmission" and "money services" statutes compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures,
see NAT' CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.200(l)(a)-(b) (2013); VA. CODE ANN. §
189.
6.2-1912.A (2014) (licensee liable for "all funds collected for transmission"); id. § 6.2-1918.A(ii)
(requirement to hold permissible investments equal to at least the aggregate market value of all
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offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"),'9 0 these
reserve requirements ensure the depositor's ability to redeem (or recover) the
same value that he or she placed with the third-party money transmitter.' 91
Some state regulators have described how their states' money transmission or
money service business statutes apply to cryptocurrencies and the entities
offering services as exchanges, as well as how statutes apply to individuals
transacting with peers.' 92 Compared to the FinCEN provisions described in the
previous section, which are focused on registration of entities offering types of
products and services and establishing their anti-money-laundering compliance
and money-service-business
state money-transmitter
responsibilities,
regulations, in our view, are more oriented towards prudential and marketenhancing purposes.
One example showing the need for prudential regulation is the case of the
Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange in Japan, which suspended operations in February
2014.193 Shortly before that event, commentators began to call for
cryptocurrency depositories (wallets and exchanges) to protect depositors'
rights to redeem their deposits by reserves, a trust, or some form of "deposit"
insurance.19 4 However, deposit insurance in the United States would not
necessarily cover bitcoin held by a bank outside the United States for a

outstanding money transmission transactions and sales of money orders from operations in all states in
which the licensee does business).

Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873
190.
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a (2012)).
191.

See THE OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY 1680-81 (3d ed. 1955) (definitions of

"redeem" and "redemption" with origins from Middle English related to deposits of funds or property
(particularly in the latter case when the deposit is for the purpose of securing an obligation)). Deposit
insurance, for example, protects the depositor's ability to redeem at par the funds deposited with a bank
or credit union or the holder of a prepaid card's ability to access the underlying funds, subject to

whatever notice the depositor and depository may have agreed upon by contract. See Insurability of
Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional Access Mechanisms, 73 Fed. Reg.
67,155-01 (Nov. 13, 2008) (revising requirements for "pass-through" deposit insurance for certain
pooled deposit accounts); Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional Access Mechanisms, New
General Counsel's Op. No. 8, FIL-129-2008, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/news

/news/financial/2008/fil08129.pdf (Nov. 17, 2008) (replacing original Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. General
Counsel Opinion No. 8 issued in 1996) [hereinafter "FIL-129-2008"].
192.
E.g., Supervisory Memorandum 1037, Regulation of Virtual Currenciesunder the
Texas Money Services Act, TEX. DEP'T OF BANKING 2-3 (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.dob.texas.gov

/public/uploads/files/consumer-information/sml037.pdf

(distinguishing

between

exchanges

of

cryptocurrencies into "sovereign currencies" via third-party providers as money transmission, and
movements from one cryptocurrency to another cryptocurrency as not constituting money transmission
regardless of the number of participants in the transactions); Guidance Document MT 2014-01, KAN.
OFF. OF THE ST. BANKING COMM'R (June 6, 2014), http://www.osbckansas.org/mt/guidance

/mt2014_01 virtualcurrency.pdf, Press Release, N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Serv., New York Requires ForeignLocated Money Transmitters including Bitcoin Exchanges and Administrators to Obtain Money
Transmitter Licenses (Mar. 31, 2011), (announcing abandonment of "physical presence" in the state as a
prerequisite for money transmitter licensure).
See Hem, Mt. Gox Offline, supranote 4.
193.
194.
See, e.g., Joe Adler, Bitcoin Backers Seek FDIC-Style Insurance, AM. BANKER

(Jan. 22, 2014 12:14 ET), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179 15/bitcoin-backers-seek-fdicstyle-insurance-1065089-1.htmi (mentioning insurance prospects through Lloyd's of London and
derivatives trading).
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customer or held by a bank or other depository or actor outside the United
States.195 For example, U.S. deposit insurance covers depositors whose deposits
are in banks insured by the FDIC, even if the depositor is not a citizen or
resident of the United States. 196 However, price fluctuations of bitcoin could
complicate deposit insurance because of the extra burden of determining the
value on initial deposit and the value at failure with the need possibly to cover a
decline in value at failure over the value at deposit. The suit brought by U.S.
persons against Mt. Gox seeking to recover for the losses of Bitcoin they had
sustained demonstrates the importance of prudential regulation and adequate
insurance or other forms of deposit protection for customers of domestic and
foreign wallets or exchange operators.197
Although it is very important, it is insufficient for the states to regulate
cryptocurrency market participants merely on a prudential basis. States also
should enact laws that assign rights and responsibilities to crypto-payments
intermediaries regarding commercial aspects of these payments transactions.
Without rules defining a participant's potential liabilities, it is not possible to
determine or guarantee that entity's safe and sound operations vis-t-vis its
customers.
3. Deposit Taking and Deposit Insurance
Taking deposits is a highly regulated business in the United States. It also
is a fundamental aspect of the highly regulated business of banking under the
National Bank Act. 198 The United States, however, has no general "law of
deposit" that would reach deposits of value made in units such as
cryptocurrencies. The United States does have a more limited-scope scheme
known as "deposit insurance." Deposit insurance provides the guarantees that
the depositor will be able to redeem-that is, to retrieve from the depositorythe same value that the depositor placed with the depository on the basis of
their original agreement up to any limit prescribed by their agreement or by any
applicable program of insurance, whether public or private. Deposit insurance
systems serve as "redeemers of last resort" for depositors in the event the
depository to which they entrusted value fails or is unable to perform.1 99
Deposit insurance has public- and market-enhancing purposes.

195.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(l)(1) (definition of "deposit"), (in) (definition of "insured
deposit) (2012). The key requirement in the definition of "deposit" is the receipt of "money or its
equivalent" by a bank or other insured financial institution. Id. § 1813(l)(1).
196.
See When a Bank Fails - Factsfor Depositors, Creditors, and Borrowers, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (July 28, 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/.

197.
See Class Action Complaint passim, Greene v. Mt. Gox Inc., No. 14-01437 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 27, 2014).
198.
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2012) (granting general powers to
national banks, including the power to take deposits of money, as well).
199.
See EBA 2014 Opinion, supra note 118, at 43 ¶ 174 (discussing special risks
associated with virtual currencies because there is no "redeemer of last resort").

525

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 32, 2015

Congress has defined the term "deposit" for purposes of Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance to mean "the unpaid balance of money
or its equivalent" received by a bank that meets certain other requirements.200
Whether holdings of cryptocurrencies can or should constitute deposits is an
interesting policy question. "Deposit"-taking institutions currently are required
to obtain and hold a banking or similar charter, and to be approved for deposit
insurance. In sharp contrast to money transmitters, which must maintain
reserves or "permissible investments" equal to their average daily transmission
liabilities in the equivalent of one-to-one reserves, 20 1 depository institutions
operate a system of fractional reserves, 20 2 loan out a portion of their deposits,
and thus are able to expand the supply of money in circulation. Indeed, the
ability of banks to increase the money supply by operating on fractional
reserves-not keeping enough money on hand to repay all of the depositors at
one time-is one of the reasons proponents believe virtual, non-fiat currencies
are superior to government-controlled currencies. 203
One could argue that treating cryptocurrencies as "deposits" for regulatory
purposes is a logical next step given the capacity for technology to blur the line
between traditional "deposits" in insured depository institutions and the
proliferating numbers of "access devices" (such as payroll or other prepaid
cards or mobile wallets) that reach pooled assets.204 Treating cryptocurrency
"deposits" as deposits for federal deposit insurance purposes would not

200.
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l) (2012).
The term "deposit" is defined for the purposes of determining eligibility for federal deposit insurance,
in part, as:

(1) the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank or savings
association in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give
credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or

thrift account, or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment
certificate, certificate of indebtedness, or other similar name, or a check or draft drawn against
a deposit account and certified by the bank or savings association, or a letter of credit or a

traveler's check on which the bank or savings association is primarily liable: Provided, That,
without limiting the generality of the term "money or its equivalent", any such account or
instrument must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when

credited or issued in exchange for checks or drafts or for a promissory note upon which the
person obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable, or for a
charge against a deposit account, or in settlement of checks, drafts, or other instruments

forwarded to such bank or savings association for collection.
201.
E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.200(1)(a)-(b) (2013). Additional examples of
these types of prudential requirements for money service businesses include surety bond and security
requirements, id. § 19.230.050, and provisions on the character and fitness of applicants for licenses, id.
§ 19.230.070(b).
JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER & RICHARD SCoTT CARNELL,
202.
BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 55-56 (3d ed. 2001).
203.
F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: THE ARGUMENT REFINED 24 (3d

ed. 1990). For additional discussion of fractional reserve systems, see Joshua N. Feinman, Reserve
Requirements: History, Current Practices, and Potential Reform, 1993 FED. RES. BULL. 569, 573

(explaining that a fractional reserve system is "one with reserve requirements of less than 100 percent").
204.
See generally FIL-129-2008, supra note 191 (revising requirements for "passthrough" deposit insurance for certain pooled deposit accounts).
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necessarily require cryptocurrencies to become "money" or "legal tender." But
it would require a legal framework-a more generalized law of deposit-that
we do not have in the United States. Our existing federal statutory depositinsurance programs focus on certain deposits in commercial banks and federal
savings institutions.205 Moreover, apart from the likely objections of other
insured depository institutions, the costs of a publicly backed deposit insurance
system-even if it were possible to insure only "domestic" deposits with
cryptocurrency wallet and exchange operators-likely would be a significant
obstacle to the "deposit" and "deposit insurance" models extending to nonbank, non-"currency" products such as cryptocurrencies.
4. SEC Broker-Dealer Registration and Compliance Requirements
Broker-dealer registration and compliance requirements form one of the
possible frameworks for regulating persons who facilitate exchanges of
cryptocurrencies. Broker-dealers execute instructions on behalf of clients and
may transfer assets from clients to third parties. But, these transactionexecution functions are primarily connected with assets held as investments.
With regard to cryptocurrencies, the security-whether interests in pools or
cryptocurrencies held separately for investment purposes or under the custody
of a broker-dealer in an entitlement account, or in cryptocurrency exchanges or
instruments based on cryptocurrencies-may need to be registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission or one or more state blue-sky regulators.
Broker-dealer registration and compliance requirements primarily serve
market-enhancing
purposes,
namely
efficiency,
transparency
and
accountability. They also deter insider abuses and market manipulation.
Broker-dealers are heavily regulated at the federal level. 206 Similar to
other financial service providers, persons subject to broker-dealer regulations
have to meet requirements related to registration, record keeping, disclosure,
and investor protection. 207 They also have responsibilities to maintain robust
customer-identification programs, 208 anti-money laundering compliance
programs,209 and economic sanctions compliance requirements.210

205.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h), (1), (m) (2012). For a discussion of the limits of the
"deposit" and "insured deposit" definitions, see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S.
426 (1986).
206.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (also called
the Exchange Act, the '34 Act, or the 1934 Act) [hereinafter "Exchange Act"]. The full text of the
Exchange Act is available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf.

207.

17 C.F.R.

§

240 (2014). For comprehensive guidance on requirements imposed

on broker-dealers, including numerous exclusions and exemptions, see Div. of Trading & Mkts., Guide
to Broker-DealerRegistration , U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N (Apr. 2008), http://www.sec.gov/divisions
/marketreg/bdguide.htm. For some additional discussion of these requirements as applied to
cryptocurrencies, see GAO-14-496, supra note 83, at 16-17.

208.
209.
210.

31 C.F.R. § 1023.220 (2014).
Id. § 1023.210.
Id. § 501.606.

527

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 32, 2015

Since 1999, banks that trade in securities must also register as brokerdealers. 2 11 Non-bank broker-dealers are required to be a member of a selfregulatory organization212 as well as of the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation ("SIPC") that insures investors against losses associated with the
failure of a broker-dealer and provides other user protections. 2 13 SIPC
compensates customers who suffer losses. 2 14 Broker-dealer operations are
subject to both public and self-regulatory scrutiny; these regulatory systems
includes specific enforcement provisions to ensure compliance as well as
remedies for investors. These regulations do not set forth the rights and
liabilities of parties to transactions in the manner of a commercial law, which is
what we recommend be developed for cryptocurrency intermediaries.
Online wallet operators and exchanges in the cryptocurrency industry do
not have comparable regulatory requirements and, as a result, their customers
are exposed to higher credit and liquidity risks of cryptocurrency wallets and
exchanges than are customers of traditional money service businesses or money
transmitters or depository institutions. This was an issue following the failure
of the Mt. Gox exchange in 2014.215 It also is a concern raised by the January
2015 suspension of certain accounts and loss of around 19,000 Bitcoin by the
BitStamp exchange; despite the security breach, Bitstamp claims it can refund
all affected account holders "in full." 2 16

The broker-dealer and securities regulation models are possible means by
which the federal government could regulate cryptocurrency market
participants engaged in securities transactions and cryptocurrency assets that
qualify as "securities," such as a unit of cryptocurrency or a right to units held
by a broker in a form of entitlement account, although cryptocurrencies
themselves are not "securities" (just as they are not "currency" or "legal
tender"). Regardless, a "securities regulation" framework would not address the
rights and duties of parties using cryptocurrencies in payment of goods or
services or the exchange of units of cryptocurrency for legal tender. Thus,
although it is highly desirable for the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to continue to regulate and supervise those who would offer securities
based on cryptocurrencies, such as it did in Securities and Exchange

211.
Definition of Terms in and Specific Exemptions for Banks, Savings Associations,
and Savings Banks Under Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 66 Fed.
Reg. 27,760 (May 18, 2001); Order Extending Temporary Exemption of Banks, Savings Associations,
and Savings Banks from the Definition of "Broker" under Section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; Notice of Intent to Amend Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47649 (Apr. 8, 2003).
212.
Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2012).
213.
15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A) (2012).
214.

Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,

http://www.sec.gov/answers/sipc.htm (last accessed Sept. 3, 2015) (explaining $500,000 limit on
insurance protection for failed broker-dealers).

528

215.

See Hem, Mt. Gox Bankruptcy Filing, supranote 5.

216.

See Bitstamp Breach, supra note 6.
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Commission v. Shavers,217 any role played by securities regulators, including
the SEC, would not resolve all of the issues involved with the use of
cryptocurrencies in payment transactions. These models would not be on par
with commercial-law, payments-execution models, such as we propose in Part
V.
5. CFTC Commodities Trading Regulation
As Part II explained, many nations have classified cryptocurrencies
including Bitcoin as "commodities" and not as "foreign currencies." As we also
have noted, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service has classified cryptocurrencies
as commodities.
Commodities trading regulation is similar to securities broker-dealer and
trading regulation in terms of the models it offers for the regulation of
cryptocurrencies and market participants. Commodities trading regulation
focuses on the market-efficiency, transparency, and accountability models we
have been discussing above, but it shares some of characteristics of the publiclaw models being employed by FinCEN or the IRS, for example, for moneylaundering prevention and detection.
Trading cryptocurrencies as futures contracts will trigger the Commodities
Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA), as amended,218 and the jurisdiction of the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 2 19 Despite the IRS's
declaration that convertible cryptocurrencies are "commodities" and thus
"property" rather than "currencies," that declaration does not automatically
trigger the provisions of the Commodities Exchange Act of 1936. CEA Section
5(b) is triggered by the trading of a commodity. If trading is occurring or about
to occur, Section 5(b) imposes both obligations to have facilities and clearing
systems cover market participants, and obligations to have market professionals
under the oversight of the CFTC. The CFTC deters price manipulation or other
market disruptions, in order to ensure financial integrity of all transactions and
to avoid systemic risk.220
For the purposes of the CEA's coverage, the key definition is the
definition of the term "commodity," which provides, following a listing of
specific tangible items, the catch-all phrase "and all services, rights, and
interests (except motion picture box office receipts, or any index, measure,
value or data related to such receipts) in which contracts for future delivery are
217.
No. 4:13-CV-416, 201 WL 4652121 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014); Press Release,
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Litigation Press Release No. 23090: Final Judgment Entered Against Trendon
T. Shavers, A/K/A "Pirateat40" - Operator of Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme Ordered to Pay More than $40
Million in Disgorgement and Penalties (Sept. 22, 2014).
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f (2012).
218.
219.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88
Stat. 1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 4a (2012)) (amending the Commodity Exchange Act of
1936 and creating the CFTC).
220.
7 U.S.C. § 5(a) (2012).
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presently or in the future dealt in." 22 1 In September, 2014, the CFTC authorized
a New Jersey-based Bitcoin exchange, TeraExchange, to execute swaps, thus
suggesting that the CFTC is indeed ready to regulate commodities trading in
Bitcoin.2 22
Like our previous observations about securities offerings and trading in
cryptocurrency assets and the role that securities regulators could play in those
transactions, the CFTC's jurisdiction would be limited to oversight of
commodities and trading transactions-it would not extend to regulation or
oversight of cryptocurrencies as methods ofpayment.
However, as a model for defining complex roles that market participants
might play, the CEA's definitions of market participants such as "commodity
pools" and "commodity
pool operators," 223 "derivatives
clearing
225
organization,"224 and "electronic trading facility"
offer templates that may be
adopted to help define different roles among market intermediaries in
cryptocurrency payments transactions. From the perspective available in mid2015, it may be that securities or commodities transactions in cryptocurrency
holdings may be more significant commercially than payments transactions in
cryptocurrency. But it is important to recall that the asserted purpose of
cryptocurrencies is to substitute for payments made in fiat currency and
through legacy payment providers such as banks. 22 6 But, in keeping with our
observations about securities regulation not being a substitute for commercial
laws governing the rights and duties of third-party participants in
cryptocurrency payment transaction execution, we do not see the regulation of
cryptocurrencies using the commodities trading regulatory scheme as the
answer to regulating third-party payment participants. In Part V, below, we
propose basic outlines for a more comprehensive payments-execution
regulatory approach that could supplement such securities or commodities
regulatory compliance requirements.
6. Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing
Regulation to identify and prevent money laundering and terrorism
financing, and to enforce other economic sanctions and anti-proliferation

221.

Id.

§

la(9).

222.
See Douwe Miedema, Bitcoin Gets Boost as U.S. Watchdog Approves First
Swap, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2014, 8:49 EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/12/us-usa-bitcoin-

cfic-idUSKBNOH7 1FU20140912.
223.
7 U.S.C. § Ia(10)-(l 1) (2012).
224.
Id. § la(15).
225.
Id. § la(16).
226.

See

FRIEDRICH

A.

VON

HAYEK,

DENATIONALIZATION

OF MONEY:

THE

ARGUMENT (1976) (arguing that government provision of currency threatens liberty and financial
stability because governments undermine the value of currency to reap revenues through inflation, and

that therefore sound money needs competition from privately issued currencies).
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purposes is primarily a federal, and sometimes international, affair. Regulations
in this category can serve important public-law purposes.
As mentioned earlier, FinCEN has promulgated and enforces detailed
anti-money-laundering regulations. 227 The regulations prescribe general riskbased assessment requirements for specific industries that the federal Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA) governs 228 and impose certain additional responsibility for
maintaining customer-identification programs229 and anti-money-laundering
compliance programs 23 0 for certain sub-industries otherwise identified as
"financial institutions." 23 1 FinCEN's 2013 and 2014 Guidances brought
operators of virtual-currency "wallets" and "exchanges" into the scope of the
term "money services" and, accordingly, into the term "financial institutions"
for BSA purposes. 23 2
Under FinCEN's 2013 Guidance, certain participants in "virtual currency"
programs became obligated to comply with regulations governing the
operations of MSBs. 23 3 These obligations include establishment of an antimoney laundering (AML) program, the details of which will depend on the
risks posed by the location, size, nature and volume of the business, and
designation of a compliance officer.2 34 Because FinCEN's AML program
requirements are risk-based, money service businesses can tailor their
compliance programs to individual business models.
Additionally, two international organizations have been studying the risks
associated with the use of cryptocurrencies, including for AML purposes. The
first is the European Banking Authority. 2 3 5 The second is the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF), an independent inter-governmental body. The FATF
describes its own role as "develop[ing] and promot[ing] policies to protect the
global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing, and the
financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."236 Both studies
explain from pan-European and OECD perspectives, respectively, the
perceived risks that cryptocurrencies may enable money laundering, terrorism
financing and (in the case of the FATF study) trafficking in weapons of mass
destruction.237

227.
228.
amended at 12 U.S.C.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See 31 C.F.R. ch. X (2013).
Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91-508, tit. 1-11, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as
§ 1829(b) (2012), 12 U.S.C. § 1951-59 (2012), and 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012)).
31 C.F.R. § 1010.220 (2013).
Id. § 1010.210.
Id. § 1010.100(f).
See 2013 FinCEN Guidance, supra note 14; Fin-2014-ROO1, supra note 77.
See FinCEN 2013 Guidance, supra note 14.
31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(b) (2011).
EBA 2014 Opinion, supranote 118, at 21-37.
Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and PotentialAML/CFT Risks, FIN. ACTION

TASK FORCE 3 (June 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/virtual-currency-keydefinitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf.
237.
Id. at 3, 9-12.
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Finally, regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) already prohibit transactions with
certain countries and with designated entities, unless the U.S. person
participating in the transaction has obtained one or more "licenses" to engage in
the transaction. 2 38 These OFAC regulations apply to transactions in goods or
services as well as to payments made in connection with these transactions. 2 39
Payments in cryptocurrencies-or, for that matter, barter exchanges involving
cattle or oil-would be covered by these OFAC restrictions on transactions.
We see no reason for additional laws or regulations in the spaces already
occupied by FinCEN and OFAC regulations.
7. Taxation
Whether and how to tax value transfers, either in the form of ordinary
income for sellers of goods or services, or as capital gains from the sale of
commodities or securities, or under some kind of "financial transaction fee"
scheme, is another regulatory issue that governments may confront in relation
to cryptocurrencies. As described in Part II above, other governments as well as
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have begun to regulate cryptocurrencies for
taxation purposes. In taxonomy, tax regulation is for public-law purposes.
In the United States, for example, the IRS has issued guidance on the tax
consequences of virtual economy transactions, stating that transactions based in
virtual currencies should be treated as exchanges of "property" for federal tax
purposes.2 40 Under the IRS's guidance, "if the fair market value of property
received in exchange for virtual currency exceeds the taxpayer's adjusted basis
of the virtual currency," the user's gain may be taxable. 24 1
Commentators expressed concern about the IRS's guidance, one arguing
that the IRS's guidance destroys the fungible nature of virtual currency,
rendering it less useful for online commerce. 242 The Government

238.
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 560.530(a)(3) (2013) (codifications of sanctions programs
enforced by OFAC) (updated to July 25, 2013 and containing information pertinent to general licenses
for transactions with Iran). For a comprehensive listing of OFAC regulations and guidance pertinent to
Iran, see Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, www.treasury.gov/resources-center/sanctions

/Programs/pages/iran.aspx (last visited May 28, 2015); Statement of Licensing Policy, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, www.treasury.gov/resource-center/Sanctions/Documents/licenses-pol.pdf

May 28, 2015).
239.

(last visited

See Office of Foreign Assets Control, What You Need To Know About U.S.

Economic Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions

/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (explaining coverage of imports from and
exports to Iran involving, with exceptions, goods, technology, or services).
240.
2014 IRS Guidance, supranote 16.
241.
Id. at Q-6.
242.
Adam Levitin, Bitcoin Tax Ruling, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 26, 2014, 9:56 am),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/03/bitcoin-tax-ruling.html; see also Robinson Meyer, Why
Bitcoin Can No Longer Work as a Virtual Currency, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2014, 12:49 pm), http://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/03/why-bitcoin-can-no-longer-work-as-a-virtual-

currency-in-l-paragraph/359648/.
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Accountability Office (GAO), however, praised the IRS's approach as a "lowcost step to potentially mitigate some of the noncompliance risks associated
with [virtual economy transactions]."243 We believe that the IRS's
acknowledgement that virtual currencies are property and not foreign currency
is correct under current law and is consistent with other governments' views, as
we described them above. 24 4 We note, however, that the record-keeping burden
placed on users is onerous and urge the IRS and tax experts to devise a more
user-friendly solution, if feasible.
Taxation principles and governments' exercise of jurisdiction to tax
property or transactions, however important to governments and market
participants, do not resolve the need for rules otherwise governing the use of
cryptocurrencies to make payments. That is, they do not address the need for a
private-law regime that allocates rights and duties to intermediaries
representing the counterparties in payments transactions. As we explain below
in more detail, a private-law regime would cover issues such as protection of
the rights to redeem units of cryptocurrencies from wallets and exchanges,
timely execution of payment or transfer instructions, error resolution rights and
procedures, and inter-participant implied warranties.
8. Remittance Transfers
The last form of regulation currently in effect in the United States that
applies to some transactions by cryptocurrency payment transaction executors
is the CFPB's 2013 consumer protection regulation of remittance transfers.24 5
These regulations serve a dual purpose in our schema: they create transparency
and accountability for consumers who send remittance payments abroad, and
they also establish certain transaction-execution norms for remittance market
participants.
The CFPB's rules define "remittance transfer" as:
(e) Remittance transfer-(l) General definition. A "remittance transfer" means

the electronic transfer of funds requested by a sender to a designated recipient
that is sent by a remittance transfer provider. The term applies regardless of
whether the sender holds an account with the remittance transfer provider, and
regardless of whether the transaction is also an electronic fund transfer, as
defined in [12 C.F.R. § 1005.3(b)].
(2) Exclusions from coverage. The term "remittance transfer" does not include:
(i) Small value transactions. Transfer amounts, as described in [12 C.F.R. §
1005.3 1(b)(1)(i)], of $15 or less. (ii) Securities and commodities transfers. Any

243.
244.
245.

GAO-13-516, supra note 83, at 17.
See discussion supraPart II.B.
12 C.F.R. pt. 1005 subpart B (2014).
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transfer that is excluded from the definition of electronic fund transfer under [12
C.F.R. § 1005.3(c)(4)]. 246

The rule also applies when a sender in the United States sends funds to a
person or business located outside the United States.247

The rule only covers "remittance transfer provider[s]" who act for
consumers in the United States. The rule defines the terms "remittance transfer
provider" and "provider" as ". . . any person that provides remittance transfers

for a consumer in the normal course of its business, regardless of whether the
consumer holds an account with such person."248 Additionally, the "sender" of
the remittance transfer whose transactions trigger the regulation's requirements

must be engaged in a transaction "primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes" and must have requested a remittance transfer provider to send a
remittance transfer to a designated recipient. "249

Two of the rule's provisions seem particularly helpful in framing payment
transaction execution rules for cryptocurrency payments.

The first is the rule

on the timing of receipts.25 0 The second is the clear definition of an "error" for
the rule's purposes, 25 1 the timing and content requirements for error notices
from senders, 252 and the timing and scope of the remedies available to
consumer senders if the remittance transfer provider concludes that an error has
occurred.25 3
In conclusion, the existing federal and state approaches to regulating
cryptocurrencies focus primarily on public-purpose goals such as the deterrence

of money laundering or of terrorist support regulations enforced by FinCEN,254
the economic sanctions regimes enforced by the Department of the Treasury's

Office of Foreign Assets Control, 25 5 and the tax-collection purposes of IRS's
2014 Guidance. 2 5 6 In our opinion, they serve their organic purposes well.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's proposed "prepaid card"
rule has defined the term "prepaid account" in a manner that it acknowledges
may cover virtual currency products. 257 Although Regulation E provides for
246.
12 C.F.R. § 1005.30(e) (2014).
247.
See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 78 Fed. Reg. 30,662, 30,662 (May
22, 2013) (explaining the scope of Section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and its mandate to
regulate cross-border remittance transfers where the sender is a consumer in the United States).

248.
12 C.F.R. § 1005.30(f) (2014).
249.
Id. § 1005.30(g).
250.
Id. § 1005.31(e)(2).
251.
Id. § 1005.33(a).
252.
Id. § 1005.33(b).
253.
Id. § 1005.33(d).
254.
See generally 31 C.F.R. ch. X (2013).
255.
See generally 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.101-596.901 (2013).
256.
See Fin-2014-ROOI,supranote 77, at 2-3; Fin-2014-R002, supranote 77.
257.
Prepaid Accounts under the Electronic Fund Transfers Act (Regulation E) and
the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 79 Fed. Reg. 77,112, 77,112-13, 77,128 (Dec. 23, 2014)
(describing the scope of the term in the proposed regulation's subsections 1005.2(b)(1), 1005.2(b)(3)).
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disclosures and error-resolution procedures, the scope of the proposed rule will
continue Regulation E's longstanding limitation to accounts held for "personal,
family, or household purposes," 258 so that it will not protect non-consumer
users.
Existing state "money transmitter" and "money services businesses"
licensing and prudential supervision regimes 259 are focused primarily on safety
and soundness. They do not govern transaction execution or allocate rights and
duties among counterparties to sales, services or financial transaction. Those
tasks are normally the province of "private" or "commercial law," such as
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, or of federal "consumer
protection laws," such as the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA").
When evaluating different regulations as models for future regulations, it
is important to consider that individual features that might look attractive on
their own are generally intertwined with and potentially inseparable from other
aspects of the single regulatory model from which they came. Some features
may be usable on a stand-alone or borrowed basis. Others may not. In other
words, if policymakers want to borrow a hat from one of these models to put
atop cryptocurrencies, they may be obligated to take the shoes-or the entire
outfit. And, perhaps, regulators should exercise caution in borrowing the whole
outfit head to toe without careful consideration of the costs as well as benefits
of the whole for the purposes under consideration.
We submit that licensure and prudential regulation of innovative products
and services, such as cryptocurrencies, or of the intermediaries that process
transactions on their clients' behalf do not always require the crafting of a
separate regulatory scheme. Often, it will be preferable to amend the existing
regulation or even to issue tailored guidance that-like FinCEN's 2013
Guidance-situates the new product or service within an existing regulatory
regime, as states such as Texas and Kansas have decided to do for now.
As we explain in our analysis of the New York State Department of
Financial Services ("NYDFS") BitLicense Final Regulation below, for some of
the proposed provisions, the Department has borrowed a hat (from their own
general "money transmitter" regulations), but also borrowed shoes from other
outfits that do not quite suit the ensemble being created, such as highly
prescriptive instead of risk-based anti-money-laundering requirements or a
cross-reference to FinCEN's requirements. We think the BitLicense Regulation
failed to take the right shoes-those that make the complete "outfit." We
submit that a wiser choice might have been to situate the licensing and
prudential supervision of cryptocurrency market participants inside the state's
existing "money services business" licensing and prudential regulatory scheme
and to leave certain proposals beyond the border of that scheme for more
general application. In other cases, such as their highly prescriptive state anti258.
259.

Id. at 77,128 (describing subsection 1005.2(b)(1)).
See 2014 IRS Guidance, supra note 16.
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money-laundering requirements, described below, we think that the NYDFS
did too much. Thus, in proposing to regulate cryptocurrency intermediaries
performing payment transaction execution services for owners of
cryptocurrencies, we recommend that regulators proceed to the extent feasible
within the frameworks that exist and craft new regulations only where
significant regulatory gaps exist, such as in transaction-execution services.
Moreover, absent solid reasons, regulators should not impose more stringent
requirements on cryptocurrency providers in the "money transmitter" or
"money-service-business" markets than they do on more traditional money
transmitters or money-service businesses.
B. New York State Department ofFinancialServices' FinalBitLicense
Regulations and its 2014 Proposal
On July 23, 2014, the New York State Department of Financial Services
("NYDFS") issued for public comment a proposed framework for regulating
cryptocurrency businesses, which it dubbed the "BitLicense." 260 On June 3,
2015, the NYDFS announced the promulgation of the final BitLicense
regulation.2 6 1 A proceeding commenced in 2013,262 the BitLicense regulations
are intended to provide a prudential licensing and regulations for
cryptocurrency market participants and consumer protection, anti-money
laundering and cyber security issues surrounding the use of Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies. 263 The final and proposed BitLicense regulationS 264 contain
provisions on subjects common to existing state money transmitter regulations,
such as licensure, examination, permissible investments, and capital
requirements. They also set forth obligations, such as suspicious activity
reporting and cybersecurity program requirements that borrow from several
other models to create an amalgam that, while at times inspired, suffers from
some weaknesses that appear to stem from the tensions and inconsistencies
between the underlying models. As explained above, the BitLicense regulation
and proposal also go beyond the requirements applicable to traditional brick260.

BitLicense Proposal, supra note 20.

For additional background, see Press

Release, NY DFS Releases Proposed Bitlicense Regulatory Framework for Virtual Currency Firms (July
17, 2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press20l4/prl407l7l.html(hereinafter "BitLicense 2014 Press
Release").
261.

Benjamin Lawsky, Superintendent, N.Y. Dep't. of Fin. Servs., Remarks at the

BITS Emerging Payments Forum, (June 3, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about
/speeches/sp150603 .htm). For the text of the regulation announced, see BitLicense Final Regulation,
supra note 21.

2013),

262.
N.Y. DEP'T. OF FIN. SERV., Notice of Inquiry on Virtual Currencies (Aug. 12,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about//press2013/memol308121.pdf
For commentary
on the

commencement of this proceeding, see Kashmir Hill, Every Important Person in Bitcoin Just Got

Subpoenaed by New York's Financial Regulator, FORBES.COM (Aug. 12, 2013 1:43 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/013/08/12/every-important-person-in-bitcoin-just-got-subpoenaedby-new-york's-financial-regulator (listing recipients).
263.
BitLicense 2014 Press Release, supra note 260.
264.
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21.
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and-mortar money transmitters and money services businesses. These proposals
seem, one could argue, designed to discourage applications for BitLicenses. On
the other hand, rules such as cyber-security compliance requirements and
designations of cyber compliance officers and basic anti-money laundering
provisions should apply generally to non-depository providers providing
intermediary services that are money transmission or are comparable to money
transmission - not only to virtual currency market participants.
Because it is the first comprehensive cryptocurrency-specific "money
services" licensing and regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies both in the
United States and worldwide, the BitLicense is positioned to be the platform
against which other cryptocurrency-specific "money services" regulations are
likely to be measured. However, the BitLicense, despite its breadth, does not
tackle important payments transaction-execution needs that we address in Part
III of this article. Still, given its lead in the race to regulate cryptocurrency
market participants, it would be an error not to examine its key features and to
evaluate the tradeoffs and limitations in regulatory choice that it presents.
In the following analysis, we focus primarily on the June 2015 final
regulation, highlighting the significant differences between the July 2014
proposed regulation and the final regulation. In this subpart, we also note those
provisions that illustrate tradeoffs and limitations in regulatory choice.
The BitLicense Final Regulation draws authority from existing New York
State laws relating to non-depository providers of "money transmission" or
"money services."265 The regulation has features that are similar to other states'
"money transmission" or "money services business" licensure and supervision
regimes. For example, the BitLicense requires anyone who engages in "Virtual
Currency Business Activity" to obtain a license,266 meet certain capital
requirements, 267 maintain books and records, 268 file financial reports, 269 and
subject themselves to examination. 270 Those who obtain licenses, who we will
refer to as "BitLicensees," are required to protect customers by three means: (1)
27
maintenance of basic capital in the form of permissible investments, 1 (2)
maintenance of "a bond or trust account in United States for the benefit of its
customers", virtual currency of the "same type and amount as that which is
owed or obligated to" a third person,2 72 and (3) observance of the prohibition
on selling, transferring, lending, hypothecating, pledging, or otherwise using or

265.

Id. (citing authority for the provisions under Financial Services Law, sections

102, 104, 201, 206, 301, 302, 309, and 408).
BitLicense Final Regulation, supranote 21, § 200.3(a).
266.
Id. § 200.8.
267.
Id. § 200.12.
268.
Id. § 200.14.
269.
Id. § 200.13.
270.
271.
Id. § 200.8(a), (b). Permissible investments for this basic requirement do not
include any form of virtual currency. Id. § 200.8(b).
Id. § 200.9(a), (b).
272.

537

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 32, 2015

encumbering assets ... held, stored, or maintained by, or under the custody or
control of, [the] Licensee on behalf of another Person."273
Additionally, the BitLicensees must appoint a compliance officer and
establish compliance policies, 274 and implement separate, not risk-based antimoney laundering programs, 2 75 cyber-security programs, 27 6 and business
continuity plans.277 Licensees' advertising and marketing materials are subject
to review. 2 78 These proposals are substantially more onerous than those
applicable to other, non-depository providers under the DFS' jurisdiction,
because they impose separate state anti-money laundering program
requirements 2 7 9 not imposed on other providers and differ from those imposed
by FinCEN on "money services businesses." 2 80
A BitLicensee is required to make a detailed set of disclosures to
customers before a transaction,2 8' obtain acknowledgement of each
disclosure, 2 82 provide a receipt for each transaction, 2 83 and establish a
complaint resolution procedure.2 84 These requirements are more burdensome
than those applicable to other, non-depository "money services" providers
under the DFS' jurisdiction.
BitLicensees also must implement an anti-fraud policy. 2 85 In addition, the
NYDFS must pre-approve all material changes to its products and services. 2 86
1. BitLicense Final Definition of "Virtual Currency"
The BitLicense defines virtual currency as "any type of digital unit that is
used as a medium of exchange or form of digitally stored value or that is
incorporated into payment system technology." 28 7 The term is to be "broadly
construed" but does not include digital units used solely as part of customer
affinity or rewards that can only be redeemed by designated merchants and not
288
converted to cash, or currencies used only within online gaming platforms.

273.
Id. §§ 200.8; 200.9((a), (c).
274.
Id. § 200.7(b).
275.
Id. §§ 200.7(c); 200.15; 200.16; 200.17.
276.
Id. § 200.16.
277.
Id. § 200.17.
278.
Id. § 200.18.
279.
Id. § 200.15.
280.
FINCEN 2013 Guidance, supra note 14, at 1-2.
281.
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, § 200.19(a), (b) and (c).
282.
Id. § 200.19(d).
283.
Id. § 200.19(e).
284.
Id. § 200.20.
285.
Id. § 200.19(g).
286.
Id. § 200.10(a). The BitLicense Final Regulation defines "material change" as
well. Id. § 200.10(b). It also specifies how a BitLicensee's plan for proposed material changes must be
explained to the NYDFS with specificity. Id. § 200.10(c).
Id. § 200.2(p).
287.
Id. § 200.2(p)(1).
288.
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The definition does not require that a virtual currency be a substitute for legal
tender, which was a cornerstone of FinCEN's conclusion that some virtual
currency activities constitute "money transmission."289 Without this limitation
in the definition, it is unclear what prevents the BitLicense Final Regulation
from applying to electronic forms of legal tender 290 or dollar-denominated
demand deposit accounts, which we discuss in more detail below. The
BitLicense defines the term "Fiat Currency" 29 1 to mean "government-issued
currency that is designated as legal tender in its country of issuance through
government decree, regulation or law." 292
2. BitLicense's Definition of "Virtual Currency Business Activity"
A BitLicense is required for anyone who engages in "Virtual Currency
Business Activity." 293 The latter term is defined to include the following types
of activities involving New York or a New York Resident:
- receiving Virtual Currency for transmission or transmitting the same;
- securing, storing, holding or maintaining custody or control of Virtual
Currency" on behalf of others;
- buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer business;
- performing retail conversion services, including the conversion or
exchange of Fiat Currency or other value into Virtual Currency, the
conversion or exchange of Virtual Currency into Fiat Currency or other
value, or the conversion or exchange of one form of Virtual Currency into
another form of Virtual Currency; or
- controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual Currency." 294
The scope of activities included here is significantly broader than that
traditionally covered by the money transmitter statutes upon which these
regulations are based. However, it is narrower than provided in the 2014
BitLicense proposal. The 2014 BitLicense proposal was unclear as to whether
merely providing software services, which enable some cryptocurrency
exchanges or administrators to operate but do not involve the receipt of funds
or cryptocurrencies for transmission from individuals, investors, or other
289.

Compare id. with FinCEN 2013 Guidance, supra note 14. For more information,

see Clearing House/ICBA Report, supra note 41, at 6.

The gap between the approaches taken by

FinCEN and the NYDFS leaves room for confusion, particularly among new entrants and innovators.
290.
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, § 200.2(e).
291.
See id. § 200.2(d). We find that the term "fiat currency" carries with it unhelpful
connotations that may obscure legal and policy discussions about virtual currency. We would have
preferred that the BitLicense regulation had used the term "legal tender" instead of "fiat currency" in its

Virtual Currency definition. See id. § 200.2(m).
292.
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, § 200.2(e).
293.
Id. § 200.3(a).
294.
Id. § 200.2(q).
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exchanges, might trigger a licensing obligation.295 Other states' money services
and money transmitter statutes cover receipt of funds or substitutes for
transmission, but not the software services that are for internal functioning
purposes, not for transmission to third parties. 296 The BitLicense Final
Regulation is now in harmony with FinCEN's 2014 determination that the
production and distribution of software, even if that software facilitates
transmission of virtual currency, do not constitute money transmission. 297
The proposed BitLicense regulations also might apply to depository
institutions that are generally exempt from similar money transmitter
regulations. 298 Banks other than those chartered under New York Banking Law
and approved by the superintendent to engage in Virtual Currency Business
Activity" are exempt from the BitLicense requirements. 299 Banks not chartered
by New York State or not also approved to engage in Virtual Currency
Business Activity will require BitLicenses. 300 We think that is unnecessary.
Merchants and consumers that use Virtual Currency "solely for the purchase or
sale of goods or services" do not require BitLicenses to proceed with
transactions.301

The "Virtual Currency Business Activity" definition is limited to activities
"involving New York or a New York resident." 302 For most internet-based
businesses, which presumably include all virtual market currency participants,
it will be extremely difficult to prevent one's business activities from involving
New York or a "New York Resident." 303 For those market participants using
money-center banks, this may be even harder. The scope of this provision
highlights the need for a more general resolution of jurisdictional questions
involving internet-based transactions.
There is no fail-safe way to determine where an internet user is located
geographically. There is no way to guarantee that one's internet traffic will not
touch a server in New York. It is impossible to prevent a New York resident
from travelling to another state and interacting with a service provider;

295.
296.
297.
298.

BitLicense Proposal, supra note 20, § 200.2.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.010(17)-(19) (2013).
See Fin-2014-R002,supra note 77, at 2.
Compare BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, § 200.3(c) (exemption

from licensing requirements limited to persons chartered under the New York Banking Law and
approved to engage in Virtual Currency Business Activity), with WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.20(4)

(2013) (chapter not applicable to financial institutions as defined in § 19.230.010(12) (2013)); VA. STAT.
ANN. § 6.2-1902.3 (2014) (chapter not applicable to banks and persons operating as agents of banks).
299.
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, § 200.2(q) (definition of "Virtual
Currency Business Activity").

300.
Id. § 200.3(c)(1).
301.
Id. § 200.3(c)(2).
302.
Id. § 2002.(2)(g), (h).
303.
Id. § 200.2(g) (New York Resident includes "any Person that resides, is located,
has a place of business, or is conducting business in New York"). There appears to be no limitation or
requirement on what type of business triggers this "conducting business in" status, though perhaps
regulations will offer more specificity on this test.
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however, there may be some limits on jurisdiction in cases in which the
resident travels to another state to transact business. 304 If there is no practical
way for a virtual currency business to avoid engaging in activity that involves
New York, there is no true limitation on New York's jurisdictional reach or on
its BitLicense requirements.
Extraterritorial application of New York law appears to be the exception,
not the rule. Indeed, the (general) presumption appears to be against
extraterritorial application. 305 We suggest that it would be beneficial for
NYDFS to create a jurisdictional "safe harbor," delineating what steps a virtual
currency business would need to take in order to be assured that it was not
engaged in activity involving New York. Adoption of guidelines that virtual
currency market participants could employ to filter out customers who are
residents of New York and reject their business would be one option. Another
would involve creating a de minimis rule that would not require a BitLicense
until the virtual currency market participant has a defined number of
transactions or transactions exceeding a specific dollar-equivalent threshold.306
Additionally, a virtual currency market participant should be able itself to
assure depository institutions with which they may deal that they are (or are
not) New York citizens or do (or do not do) sufficient business in the state to
meet its nexus tests without being required to obtain a BitLicense.
3. BitLicense's Licensing Requirements
In addition to eligibility requirements, the BitLicense requires that entities
holding funds on behalf of another person must hold the same type and amount
of virtual currency. 307 With respect to amount, this provision follows the
"money transmission" model and not the "deposit" model, as described above.
The requirement to hold the same type of cryptocurrency as the transaction
instructs be paid or exchanged makes sense because third-party intermediaries
could offer to execute transactions in more than one cryptocurrency and the
counterparties in cryptocurrency transactions - whether used in payments or for
other purposes - may have contractual rights to receive payment in specific
cryptocurrencies, as opposed to receiving cryptocurrencies of a comparable
value on a given date.

See, e.g., Midwest Title Loans Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2010), cert
304.
denied 131 S. Ct. 83 (2010) (denying jurisdiction of Indiana law to consumer transaction in which the
consumer had to cross over into Illinois physically to sign the loan agreement and receive the loan

proceeds).
305.

Global Reinsurance Corp.-U.S. Branch v. Equitas Ltd., 18 N.Y.3d 722, 735

(2012) ("The established presumption is, of course, against the extraterritorial operation of New York
law.")

306.

See, e.g., 12 C.F.R.

§

1005.30(e)(1)(i) (2012) (defining small remittances as

outside the rule's coverage).

307.

Id.

§ 200.9(b).
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4. BitLicense's Anti-Money-Laundering and Customer Identification
Requirements
U.S. anti-money-laundering laws generally allow entities to make their
own risk-based assessments or the money-laundering risks to which they are
exposed, and to implement, monitor, and adjust their programs and retrain
personnel to ensure compliance. 3 08 They are otherwise not prescriptive of the
steps that must be taken by licensees. For example, FinCEN regulations
require a money services business to establish an anti-money laundering
program that is "reasonably designed to prevent money laundering and the
financing of terrorist activities" and that is "commensurate with the risks posed
by the location and size of, and the nature and volume of the financial services
provided." 30 9 Likewise, the BSA examination process for MSBs takes a riskbased approach.31 o
In contrast, the BitLicense regulation is prescriptive, not risk-based. For
example, BitLicense requires customer identification including name and
physical location. 311 Collection or maintenance of customer identification
information is not a general requirement under state Money Service Business or
Money Transmitter acts. However, the USA Patriot Act imposed section 326
"customer identification program" requirements on entities that were required
to adopt section 352 "anti-money-laundering-compliance programs." 312 The
federal "customer-identification-program" requirement does not require capture
or retention of the customer's "physical location." 313 Rather, FinCEN's
regulations - like its Joint Final Rule with the SEC in 2003 - allow entities
such as the broker-dealers in that Joint Final Rule - to satisfy this requirement
by any one of several means. 314 The Section-by-Section Analysis of the 2003
Joint Final Rule
implementing the customer-identification-program
requirements offers more flexible means of satisfying the "address"
requirement in the Rule and is not limited to a home address. 315 The

308.
31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.210, 1022.210(d)(2)(ii), 1022.210(d)(3)-(4) (2012); 31 U.S.C.
5318(h)(1) (2013).
309.
31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(a) and (b) (2013).
310.
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money
Laundering Examination Manual for Money Services Businesses 26-29 (2009), http://www.fincen.gov
Inewsroom/rp/files/MSB_ExamManual.pdf.
311.
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, § 200.15(1)(1).
312.
USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§
5311 et seq.). The interagency rule implementing the customer-identification program was codified

originally at 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.121 et seq. (2003).
313.
31 C.F.R § 1010.312 (2013) (requirement to record and verify customers' names,
addresses and identities, account numbers, and federal tax identification (SSN or EIN) numbers if the

transaction is being conducted on behalf of another person or entity).
314.
See Joint Final Rule- Customer Identification Programs for Broker-Dealers, 31
C.F.R. § 103.122(b) (2003), subsequently re-codified at 31 C.F.R. § 1023.220(a), 75 Fed. Reg. 65806,
65809 (Oct. 26, 2011).
315.
See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220(a)(2)(i)(A)(3) (2012) (recodified from 31 C.F.R. §
103.122(b) (2003)).

542

Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries
BitLicense's requirement to collect and maintain the physical location for the
customer raises issues about the feasibility of a requirement to record the
customer's physical location at a particular time because of the ease of adopting
a situs different from an actual situs, and attendant enforcement issues for a
wallet or exchange that collected information that later proved inaccurate.3 16
The BitLicense's "physical location" requirement perhaps could be associated
with the jurisdictional "hook" that the BitLicense Final Regulation will
utilize, 317 rather than with its customer-identification provisions.
In addition to other new AML and customer identification requirements in
the proposed New York State regulations, the New York regulations will
require licensees to file suspicious activity reports with the State of New York,
even if FinCEN's regulations would not require a filing. 1 The BitLicense
Final Regulation requires that BitLicensees report, in cases in which
transactions are not subject to currency transaction reporting under federal law,
transactions in aggregate amounts exceeding U.S.D. $10,000 in one day, within
24 hours, 3 19 as opposed to the longer period allowed by FinCEN. 32 0 The virtual
currency community likely will see these requirements as problematic because
they exceed applicable FinCEN requirements.
Three final issues arise from the BitLicense Final Regulation, which tends
in these respects to be an improvement over the Proposed Regulation. First, the
responsibility to report suspicious activity affects only BitLicensees, not
including certain vendors and software developers. 3 2 1 These categories of
participants may have no direct dealings with the day-to-day operations of the
licensees or their customers, but they may see activities by licensees that should
be brought to the attention of the Department of Financial Services, including
vulnerabilities such as those that allegedly caused Mt. Gox to suspend its
operations in 2014.322 Second, the record-retention period for transactions will
be seven years,323 as compared with the five years under FinCEN's
regulations. 324 We are not certain that the Regulation's longer records retention
period is justified. Third, the Regulation has a Suspicious Activity Report
("SAR") requirement that in many cases will duplicate the FinCEN regime.

316.
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, § 200.15(d)(1).
Id. § 200.2(q) (limiting to holders of BitLicensees "Virtual Currency Business
317.
Activity" involving New York or a New York Resident), (h) (defining New York Resident).
318.
Id. §§ 200.15(e)(3)(i). FinCEN's regulations require a filing if a transaction is
suspicious or if it involves a transfer of $2,000 or more. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320(a)-(f) (2011).
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, § 200.15(e)(2).
319.
320.
31 C.F.R. § 1022.320(a)-(f) (2011) (money services businesses have 30 days to
file suspicious activity reports).

§ 200.15(d)(3).

321.

BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21,

322.

Hem, Mt. Gox Offline, supra note 4; Hem, Mi. Gox Bankruptcy Filing, supra

323.

BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21,

note 5.

§

200.12(a).

The Regulation

provides for a five-year retention of records of "non-completed, outstanding, or inactive accounts or

transactions" to be treated as abandoned property after the five-period expires. Id.
324.
31 C.F.R. § 306(a)(2).

§ 200.12(c).
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We are not certain that it is fair to require reports duplicative of federal filings.
Final questions about transaction and SAR reporting under Section 200.12
relate to two subjects: (1) what is New York going to do with these data? and
(2) will the data enjoy the same protections, such as under the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978325 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act3 26 that they
currently have under federal law? The Final Regulation answers neither of
these questions.
5. BitLicense's Consumer Disclosures
The BitLicense Final Regulation includes highly prescriptive consumer
disclosure requirements 327 that exceed those imposed under many of the models
for analogous products. For example, the BitLicense Final Regulation requires
licensees to inform customers of a long list of "material risks" associated with
cryptocurrency, including the fact that (1) it is not legal tender, is not FDIC
insured, and may be adversely affected by legislative and regulatory change,
(2) that payment/ transfer transactions are generally irreversible, and (3) that
there is no assurance that other parties will continue to accept virtual
currency. 328 In contrast, Regulation E has nothing like the "material risk"
disclosures and its required initial disclosures focus on product features and
limitations, liability and fees. 329 Generally, in the United States, the obligation
to disclose material facts is frequently limited to relationships in which the
provider owes a fiduciary duty to the customer, such as broker-dealer and
investment advisor relationships. 330 BitLicensees also must disclose "general
terms and conditions" such as the customer's liability for unauthorized

325.
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2011) (creating
with exceptions statutory rights to replace the Fourth Amendment protection for bank records following
the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).).
326.
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681(a) (2011) (containing
limitations on sharing of information from consumers' credit histories with law enforcement agencies
and others).
327.
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, § 200.19.
328.
Id. § 200.19(a)(l)-(10).
329.
12 C.F.R. § 1005.7 (2012).
330.
Investment advisors are considered to have fiduciary responsibilities to clients.
See Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 69,013, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3558, at 3 (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/34-69013.pdf.
[hereinafter SEC Release 34-69013]. Broker-dealers are not normally treated as fiduciaries to their
clients. Id.; see also supra note 3. State common law normally defines the instances in which brokerdealers owe duties to their customers, including when the broker-dealer exercises "discretion or control
over customer assets, or has a relationship of trust and confidence with their customers" that is "similar
to that of investment advisors." Staff of the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Study on Investment Advisers
and Broker-Dealers as Requiredby Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N viii, 101, 109, 166 (Jan. 2011), www.sec.gov/news/studies/201 1
/913studyfinal.pdf. In the Study, the SEC's staff made recommendations for "enhanced consumer
protections" and also to "decrease retail customers' confusion about the standard of conduct owed to
them when their financial professional provides them with personal advice." SEC Release 34-69013,
supra note 330, at 6 & note 10. See also supra note 3 (citing United States v. Skelly, 442 F. 3d 94, 98
(2d Cir. 2006)).
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transactions, privacy policies and the customer's right to receive periodic
statements, receipts and prior notice of changes. 33 1 A final provision that may
prove hard to implement is the requirement to give consumers receipts. 332
333
Moreover, the DFS may request the form of the BitLicensees' receipts.
In addition, disclosures must be made prior to each transaction, detailing
the type and amount of the transaction and any fees to be assessed along with a
warning that the transaction may not be undone. 334 This disclosure scheme is
far more rigid and detailed than that imposed on money transmitters and
electronic payment providers, but it is similar to disclosures required of entities
33
engaged in cross-border remittance transfers under Regulation E.
6. BitLicense's Requirements Related to Engaging in Fraudulent Activity
and to Detecting and Deterring Fraud
The BitLicense regulation prohibits BitLicensees from engaging in
fraudulent activity." 336 The Regulation does not define "fraud." 3 The

BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21,
331.
and conditions), 200.19(c) (terms of specific transactions).

§

200.19(b)(1)-(7) (general terms

332.
Id. § 200.19(e). In connection with the requirement to give receipts, we note that
questions will arise about the content requirements for receipts. Consumers in the United States are
accustomed to receipts that truncate all but the last four digits of credit card numbers, for example.
Whether truncation of the "addresses" associated with the initiator and recipient of the crypto-payment
will be required is one of the issues to be resolved. For discussion of the issue of truncation of account

&

numbers in other electronic payments systems, see Patricia J. Allouisie, Stephen T. Middlebrook,

Sarah Jane Hughes, Developments in the Laws Affecting Electronic Payments and Stored Value
Products: A Year of Stored-Value Bankruptcies, Significant Legislative Proposals, and Federal

Enforcement Actions, 64 Bus. LAW. 219, 229-233 (2008) (discussing litigation involving the failure to
truncate card numbers on some receipts pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 168 1(c) (2013)). The article explains the
split of federal district courts on the application of this subsection to internet transactions. Id. at 231-233.

333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. § 200.19(f).
Id. § 200.19(c).
12 C.F.R. § 1005 (2012).
BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21,

§

200.19(g).

The 2014 draft

regulation also had reached fraud perpetrated by third parties, providing that "customers of Licensees
that are victims of fraud shall be entitled to claim compensation from any trust account, bond, or

insurance policy maintained by the Licensee." BitLicense Proposal, supra note 20,

§

200.19(g). The

Proposal failed to limit customer's fraud rights under the proposal to fraud committed by the
BitLicensee. It provided no claims process or deadline. Deletion of the compensation provision no doubt
will be a welcome change for BitLicensees, and a disappointment for some users and user advocates
See James A. Deeken, Choice of Law in Contract-FraudClaims - New York v.
337.
Delaware, AKIN GuMP 1 (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.akingump.com/en/experience/practices/corporate
(last visited Dec.
/ag-deal-diary/choice-of-law-in-contractual-fraud-claims-new-york-vs-delaware.htm
5, 2014) (brief discussion of elements of contract-fraud causes of action in New York State).
The author points out that the elements include:
1. Representation was made of a material fact.
2. Representation was untrue.
3. Party making the representation knew it was untrue.
4. Representation was made with the intent to deceive and for the purpose of inducing the
recipient to act upon it.
5. Recipient justifiably relied on the representation.
6. By relying on the untrue statement, the recipient suffered damages.
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BitLicense also requires BitLicensees to detect and deter fraud being
committed by third parties. This duty raises the question of whether the courts
will recognize a private right of action for consumers, and, if so, whether the
BitLicensee's liability would be limited to the value of its trust account, bond
or insurance policy. In the former connection, implied private rights of action
are not always recognized.33 In the latter, a disclosure of any applicable cap on
recovery would help users decide whether to risk the loss of their assets or to be
limited in their potential recoveries.
On balance, the BitLicense Final Regulation addresses many concerns that
we had about the 2014 Proposal, but it does not answer questions that we have
noted above that are likely to require answers.
IV. What Other Factors Should We Consider in Deciding Whether and How to
Regulate Cryptocurrencies Generally or Cryptocurrency Intermediaries?
The progress of e-payments in the 50 years since e-payments first
emerged suggests that first system rules and eventually formal regulations
follow initial periods of non-regulation. System rules and regulations mature
and then afford protections of counterparties to transactions.
A prime example of maturation in payment methods to the point of
regulation is found in the regulatory history of "wire transfers" or "fund
transfers." The ability to transfer funds by wire arose shortly after the advent of
the telegraph in the 1 9 th century 339 to move funds speedily (by the standards of
the day), and arguably more securely than transportation of money, drafts, or
even letters of credit. Then, the Uniform Law Commission study committee
known as the "3-4-8 Committee" reported out a proposal that addressed issues
relative to consequential damages for delays of wire transfers, funds sent to the
wrong recipient, and other errors, and offered protections beyond bilateral
contracts and some system rules. 34 0 Their work led to Article 4A of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which all the states have adopted.341 The issue has

Jd. (citing e.g., DynCorp v. GTE Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 308, 326 (S.D.N.Y 2002); Brown v. Lockwood,
76 A.D.2d 721, 730 (2d Dep't 1980); Banque Arabe et Internationale D'Investissement v. Maryland
Nat'l Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1995)).
338.
See Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S.--(June 13,
2011) (No. 09-525) (expanding on the ruling in Stoneridge Inc. Partnersv. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148 (2007)).
339.
U.C.C. art. 4A, pref. note (1989), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title
=UCC%20Article%204A,%2OFunds%2OTransfers%20%281989%29. For a useful overview of Article
4A and the specific issues it was drafted to address, see Robert G. Ballen & Natalie H. Diana, The Need

for Article 4A, 45 BUS. LAW. 1399 (1989-1990).
340.
See Uniform Law Comm'n., UCC Article 4A, Funds Transfers (2012), http://
www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%204A,%2OFunds%2OTransfers%20%281989%
29 (last visited May 29, 2015) (reflecting amendments made in 2012 of the original 1989 uniform law).
341.
See Fred H. Miller & Sarah Jane Hughes, Interim Report of the Study Comm. on
Alt. & Mobile Payment Sys. (2014) (copy on file with the authors).
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-

been raised whether Article 4A could serve as a model for - or the home of
regulation of transactions involving virtual currencies. 342
Specific events, such as FinCEN's 2013 Guidance, the collapse of the Mt.
Gox Bitcoin exchange in February 2014, and the BitLicense proposal have
ended the wait-and-see approach that many states and Congress followed in
2013. Thus, in contrast to the slow development of wire-transfer regulations
over a century, and even of e-commerce over the last 20 years, the moment for
regulation of cryptocurrencies is upon us.
Proponents of cryptocurrencies maintain that early regulation could
hamper development in this space, particularly as innovations may proceed
from the underlying distributed computing technologies - those that go beyond
making payments or storing value. The risk here is that we might miss uses of
the distributed computing technology that underlies the block chain in Bitcoin
for tracking intangibles - particularly intangible financial assets such as emortgages or e-notes or copyrighted intangibles. Such uses could be as
revolutionary as barcodes once were for the tracking of physical objects in
space. One commentator has referred to Bitcoin as an "Internet-for-value
exchange." 343 The distributed computing technology that underlies the blockchain could be used to restrict or at least serve as a check against unauthorized
transfers or uses. 344 We should not regulate cryptocurrencies in such a manner
that investments in potential future applications and resulting technologies will
not be made.
The second risk relates to the prospects of adopting the wrong regulation,
for example by over-regulating or under-regulating the most pressing
regulatory issues. The degree of "regulatory risk" from the first actor to
regulate could depend on the purpose for which the regulations were designed.
As noted above, 34 5 the BitLicense appears to be a regulate-for-many-purposes
proposal covering subjects beyond the existing money transmission and money
services regulations. The BitLicense duplicates subjects - particularly related to
anti-money laundering issues - that are fully covered by existing federal
requirements such as FinCEN's requirements discussed elsewhere in this
Feature. 346 Regulatory overlap such as the anti-money laundering requirements
in the BitLicense and FinCEN regulations will be costly for participants and
possibly confusing.

342.
Id.
343.
See Andrew Barnes, Digging Deeper with Ripple: The Internet of Money,
PAYMENT WEEK (Apr. 14, 2014), http://paymentweek.com/2014-4-14-digging-deeper-with-ripple-theinternet-of-money-4534 (comments of Chris Larsen, founder and CEO of Ripple, mentioning that
Bitcoin shows the world "how to confirm financial transactions without a central operator").

344.

See Nakamoto, supra note 15, at 1, 2, 5 & 8; Fistful of Bitcoins, supra note 2, at

345.

For more discussion, see Part Ill.B supra and text accompanying notes 260-86.

346.

Supra notes 241 to 249.

11-12.
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A third set of questions relates to whether regulators should segregate the
regulation of new technologies from regulation of products with which they
may compete. For example, should we regulate cryptocurrencies as payments
mechanisms separately from existing payments or should regulations affecting
existing mechanisms be amended to take cryptocurrency transactions into their
scope? In addition to the prospect of using Uniform Commercial Code Article
4A or a model based on it, other regulatory frameworks that exist at least for
consumer payments include the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act. In a
recent proposal to amend the regulations that implement the EFTA, the CFPB
states that its review of virtual currencies is "ongoing." 347 A representative of
the Bitcoin Foundation recently asked whether Bitcoin could be "integrated ...
into existing financial regulations." 34 8
Was the Foundation's suggestion unrealistic? We do not think so. Rules
that exist for physical-world transactions can apply to new technologies and
avoid unfair competition from them vis-d-vis older-style systems that the new
technologies may disrupt. Adaptation of an existing framework to include
emerging products can avoid uncertainties and delays attendant to the
regulatory process and the risk of slower adoptions by end-users in unregulated
space.
The Bitcoin Foundation's question suggests that cryptocurrencies may
follow the path that disruptors such as PayPal followed more than a decade ago.
PayPal buckled down and obtained money transmitter licenses from all the
states that require them. 349 Keeping cryptocurrencies in the money transmitter
framework also offers a benefit of greater interstate consistency that the
BitLicense does not offer.
Beyond those questions, the choice of regulatory approach could be made
in terms of whether regulators see the innovation in cryptocurrencies primarily
as a storage of value useful primarily to make payments or whether regulators
see them as commodities, securities, or some combination of stored-value,
payments technologies, commodities and securities. Each of these regulatory
schemes has merit, and, as we have explained in this Part, each may be needed
to achieve a fully functioning marketplace for cryptocurrencies innovations to
grow. Despite the normative value of some regulatory schemes, some are more

347.

CFPB Prepaid Accounts Proposal, supra note 79, at 77121.

348.
See Michael Virtanen, New York Regulators Proposes Regulations for Bitcoin,
Other Virtual Currencies, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2014), reprinted in New York Regulators Propose
Regulations For Bitcoin, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 21, 2014), http://www.dispatch.com/content

/stories/business/2014/07/21/new-york-proposing-regulations-for-bitcoin.html.
349.
For 10-Q disclosures showing the progress of PayPal's licensure as a money
transmitter and compliance with the EFTA, see eBay Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 44 (Apr. 25,
2007); eBay Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 46 (July 27, 2007); eBay Inc., Quarterly Report (Form
10-Q) 50 (Oct. 29, 2007). For an insider's view of money transmitter licensing, see Sean Sposito,
PayPal Veterans Share State Licensing War Stories, AM. BANKER (Aug. 6, 2013 6:25pm ET),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_151/paypal-veterans-share-state-licensing-war-stories-

1061148-1.html (remarks attributed to John Muller, [then] General Counsel of PayPal).
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likely to contribute to this growth potential than others. For example, as we
have noted, cryptocurrencies in themselves are not "currency" for all purposes,
and also are not commodities or securities.
As the regulation of cryptocurrency payments or of commodities
transactions in which cryptocurrencies are the underlying assets proceeds, we
submit that policy makers should assign regulatory responsibilities to those
with the most experience regulating the functionalities that are causing the
issues requiring regulation and with the greatest available resources to engage
in the effort (effectively, a boots-on-the-ground approach to allocating
responsibility).
If we follow this approach, then states should regulate the paymentexecution aspects because they have the greatest experience with regulating
non-depository providers of payments and stored-value products, money
transmitter licensing and supervision regimes and supervisory personnel in
place, and the deepest experience licensing emerging entities in this space such
as PayPal.
Regulation for certain purposes such as income recognition and tax
collection, anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorist financing, economic
sanctions, and the regulation of securities and derivatives based on market
values of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin should be handled at the federal
level.
V. A Proposed Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments
Intermediaries who Execute Payments for Goods and Services from U.C.C.
Article 4A
Readers already know that we propose that a commercial law regulating
the terms and conditions of transfers of cryptocurrencies in payment of goods
and services. This subject is a step not so far addressed by ongoing work by the
States or the Federal Government. We explained that commercial-law rules
contribute to uniformity and predictability for counterparties and may lead to
greater numbers of adoptions of - and investments in - these new payments
technologies. This is not an alternative to ongoing regulatory work. Rather, it
is the missing link, if you will, in the progress of cryptocurrencies as payment
methods.
Your authors have had special opportunities to consider the usefulness of
a commercial law for cryptocurrencies over the past 18 months. In December
2014, the ULC's Study Committee on Alternative and Mobile Payments (in
which we both participated in one capacity or other) issued its final report
recommending that the ULC authorize a drafting committee to regulate
cryptocurrency market participants offering transaction-execution services and
users of cryptocurrencies to make payments. 350 The report does not set forth the
350.

ULC STUDY COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 23.
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specifics of such regulation, but speaks in terms of regulating the rights and
duties of cryptocurrency-payment participants with roles in transaction
execution, among other things, primarily from a commercial law perspective. 35 1
This Part of this Article outlines key topics that should be considered in a
framework for regulating the rights and duties of cryptocurrency payments
users, including the intermediaries that operate depositories and execute
transactions as providers of "wallets" 352 and "exchanges." 353 It does not
contain draft language for the purposes of dealing with those topics.
In making the following recommendations for subjects that a regulation of
cryptocurrency payments intermediaries- wallet and exchange operators for
the most part- should take into account, we have looked to provisions of
Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A. Article 4A serves as the basis for state
laws regulating "funds transfers" also known as "wholesale wire transfers" in
which commercial banks act for the originator and beneficiary and also serve as
intermediaries in the series of transfers needed to push funds into the
beneficiary's account. 354
Any framework regulating transaction-execution intermediaries should
cover all of the following issues, relationships, and miscellaneous issues that
Article 4A covers to the extent that they arise in cryptocurrency transactions:
- defining the framework's subject matter and covered participants,
- giving cryptocurrency payment instructions to their respective
intermediaries,
- executing senders' cryptocurrency payments instructions,
- fixing the Timing and Effect of Payments; Obligations to the Initiator of
the Payment Instruction; Obligations of Intermediaries to Complete
Transaction; Discharge of Underlying Obligations, and,
- addressing miscellaneous Issues that include provisions related to
creditor service of process.
We do not build on provisions of Article 4A that, in our view, are not
needed for cryptocurrency transaction intermediaries. This Part of this Article
also discusses the reasons why each of these subjects should be included in any
cryptocurrency-intermediary payment regulatory framework.

351.
See id.
352.
See Fistful of Bitcoins, supra note 2, at 10-12 (describing how Bitcoin works and
the third-party providers known as "wallets" or "exchanges" that users use to store their bitcoin). The
BitLicense Final Regulation uses neither of these terms in its definition of "virtual currency business
activity" but its language would encompass both terms. BitLicense Final Regulation, supra note 21, §
200.2(n).
353.
See id.
354.
U.C.C. § 4A-104(a) (2012) (definition of "funds transfer").
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A. The Subject Matter and Covered Participants
Unless amendments to a federal consumer financial protection law such as
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 355 cover transactions in which the initiator
and obligor of an underlying transaction is a consumer, a new law governing
cryptocurrency payments should govern the rights of consumers and persons
and entities to which they owe payments for goods or services, the operators of
cryptocurrency wallets and exchanges, and any other entity whose services are
required to complete a cryptocurrency payment transaction. The new
Regulation E provisions would cover only transactions in which a consumer is
the initiator or sender of the payment or transactions in which a consumer's
account is debited or credited regardless of whether the consumer involved is
the initiator or the recipient of the payment.
The provisions of any new payments law governing cryptocurrency
payments, as the Official Comment to U.C.C. § 4A-102 proposed,356 should
cover many subjects. These will include provisions to assign responsibilities,
define key behavioral norms, allocate risks, and (perhaps) assign limits on
liability so that cryptocurrency payments participants can predict risks, insure
against them, adjust transaction-specific as well as generic security procedures,
and price their services according to the risks they have identified and the costs
of providing those services.
The participants and the roles they perform should also be defined in any
statute or regulation that may be enacted or adopted. Although much of the
terminology that Article 4A uses could be used in the cryptocurrency payments
laws, the risk of confusing some participants would be greater if the same terms
were used, particularly because Article 4A does not apply to consumer
transactions governed by federal law.357 For this reason, and only for the
purposes of this Article and not for drafting of legislation, we propose that the
person issuing the instruction to a wallet, exchange, or other intermediary to
make a payment for goods or services, as well as to [convert] cryptocurrency to
fiat currency, be known as the initiator. The operator of a public wallet in
which owners may store cryptocurrencies should be known as the wallet
operator. The operator of an exchange that offers transaction execution services
to the public should be known as the exchange operator. The beneficiary of a
payment for goods and services can be known as the recipient, and if the
transaction involves the conversion of cryptocurrency for fiat currency or vice
versa, the party requesting the conversion can be known as the conversionrequester. The transactions will be called payment instructions if they pertain to
payments for goods and services or conversion instructions if they pertain only

355.
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2013).
356.
U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. (1989).
357.
U.C.C. § 4A-108 (2012) (reflecting an amendment necessitated by amendments
to 15 U.S.C. § 1693-1693r (2013)).
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to conversion between one cryptocurrency and a different cryptocurrency, or a
conversion to legal tender.
B. Requirementsfor CryptocurrencyPayment Instructions to Operatorsof
Wallets and Exchanges
Aside from the operational requirements that banks offering wholesale
wire transfers may specify in contracts with their customers, U.C.C. Article 4A
sets forth specific requirements for the issuance and acceptance of payment
orders."' Operators of public wallets and exchanges should be required to have
transparency on each of the following types of subjects:
(1) Security Procedures. Wallets and exchange operators should require
agreement with their customers on the scope and details of any security
procedure needed to verify the rights of an initiator to give a payment
instruction to the wallet or exchange. The wallet or exchange operator will need
to use the security procedure to detect unauthorized payment instructions or
conversion instructions or errors in the transmission or content of the payment
or conversion instruction.
(2) Provisions for the duty of the recipients of payment instructions to
execute them, including the prospect of additional contractual provision
requirements related to security of the transaction, amendments and
cancellations of payment instructions, and other operational concerns. This
group of provisions could look much like those in Part 2 of Article 4A ("Issue
and Acceptance of Payment Orders"). They would relate to the operator's
ability to rely on the security procedure, rules (if appropriate) for amending or
cancelling payment instructions before the operator acts on them, enforceability
or unenforceability of certain payment instructions, duty of the initiator to
report lost cryptocurrency or unauthorized payment instructions, handling of
payment instructions that are erroneous (including possible misidentification of
the recipient's account or account to which converted cryptocurrency should be
sent or of the operator to which cryptocurrency should be sent), and the ability
of the operator to reject a payment instruction that does not comply with any
security requirements added by contract.
(3) Execution of Cryptocurrency Payment Instructions. Like Part 3 of
U.C.C. Article 4A ("Execution of Sender's Payment Order by Receiving
Bank"), new laws or regulations related to execution of cryptocurrency
payments instructions or conversion instructions should deal with:
- The date of the execution of the transaction requested,
- The operator's obligations in executing the payment instruction, errors in
the execution of payment instructions, and

358.
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- The duty of the initiator to report errors in the execution of payment
instructions.
(4) Timing and Effect of Cryptocurrency Payments Instructions;
Discharge of Underlying Obligation of the "Sender" of the Payment
Instruction. Like section 4A-406 ("Payment by Originator to Beneficiary;
Discharge of Underlying Obligation") generally, rules setting both the timing
of payments made through the intermediary and the amount of the payment
made should be in any commercial law that governs cryptocurrency payments
intermediaries. 359 In addition, like section 4A-406(b), payments made to satisfy
obligations should discharge those obligations "to the extent discharge would
360
with
result from payment to the beneficiary of the same amount in money"
exceptions comparable to those stated in this subsection. Those exceptions
include cases in which (i) the payment was made by a means prohibited in the
contract between initiator and beneficiary, 361 (ii) the recipient refused the
payment within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the payment, 362 (iii)
the recipient never withdrew the cryptocurrency or applied it to the debt, or
(iv) the recipient would suffer a loss that "could reasonably have been avoided
364
if payment had been made by a means complying with the contract."
(5) Right of the initiator to be subrogated to the rights the recipient to
receive payment from the recipient's agent in the event that the payment does
not result in a discharge under the discharge rules. 365
(6) Amount of payment and resulting discharge if intermediaries for the
initiator and recipient, or other intermediaries, deduct charges from the amount
66
of the payment instruction sent, comparable to the rule in section 4A-406(c).
Section 4A-406(c) also deems the payment to the beneficiary to be an amount
equal to the amount of the originator's payment order unless the beneficiary
makes a demand on the originator to pay over the deducted charges and the
originator does not pay them. 367 Although one of the values of using current
cryptocurrencies in payments is lower transaction-execution charges, as cryptopayments intermediaries develop their markets or add value by offering the
equivalent of deposit insurance, pricing could rise. Thus, the issue of fee
deductions along the path from initiator to recipient could arise as the market
matures and should be considered.

359.
360.
361.

Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 4A-406(a).
§ 4A-406(b).
§ 4A-406(b)(i).

Such a requirement protects a counterparty that expects legal

tender, not cryptocurrencies, in payment of the obligation.

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 4A-406(b)(ii).
§ 4A-406(b)(iii).
§ 4A-406(b)(iv).
§ 4A-406(b) (last sentence).
§ 4A-406(c).
§ 4A-406(c).
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(7) Like section 4A-406(d), the rules for cryptocurrency intermediaries
should provide that no agreement except one made by the initiator and recipient
of the crypto-payment should affect the rights and obligations to the
cryptocurrency payment instruction. 368 Such a provision would protect the
initiator and recipient from terms of agreements that might arise between
intermediaries, while also preserving the rights of initiator and recipient to vary
the terms of the regulation by their own agreement.36 9
These types of provisions are needed to balance the interests of expert
providers (including online wallet and exchange providers) with those of the
general public who may acquire or use cryptocurrencies through purchase or
receive them in payment for goods and services, but who are not expert
cryptocurrency market participants.
C. Fees and Fee Disclosures
The Uniform Commercial Code does not address issues such as fees or fee
disclosures made by banks under Article 4A. But federal consumer financial
protection statutes and the regulations that implement them do. Crypto-payment
intermediaries will operate more like providers of remittance transfers under
the EFTA 370 and Regulation E37 ' and, when consumers are the initiators of
crypto-payments instructions, it is not unthinkable that fee disclosures of the
types and at times required by Regulation E's remittance transfer provisions
could be appropriate. Section 1005.31(b) requires pre-payment disclosures of
fees imposed by the provider of the remittance transfer and the recipient's
provider, and of taxes that the provider will collect on behalf of a state or other
governmental body including by someone in the chain needed to complete the
transaction, such as a foreign provider, to the extent the provider in the United
States collects them up-front from the sender of the payment. 372 Pre-transaction
fee disclosures are one of the potential rules in a crypto-payments transaction
execution regulation that would apply primarily to consumers.
D. Rules Governing UnauthorizedTransfers, including Counterfeits and
Replicates, and ProvidingError-Resolutionor Reversibility Rights
Bitcoin was designed to overcome some of the problems with payments
systems. Among these was the absence, as Satoshi Nakamoto explained, of a
"mechanism ... to make payments over a communications channel without a
trusted party." 373 Instead Nakamoto suggested "cryptographic proof' could
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substitute for trust and "[allow] any two parties to transact directly with each
other without the need for a trusted third party." 374 Nakamoto further explained
that the "peer-to-peer electronic cash system" proposed would involve
"[t]ransactions that are computationally impractical to reverse" and that feature
would "protect sellers from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily
be implemented to protect buyers." 7 Additionally, Nakamoto proposed to
solve the problem of "double-spending" by "using a peer-to-peer distributed
timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of
transactions."376 These provisions serve to protect participants making
transactions on the block chain, but they do not provide equal protection to
participants using payments intermediaries to execute their transactions.
Payment transaction-execution rules normally contain provisions to
allocate risks of unauthorized transfers, counterfeits, and double-spending or
replicates. Despite protections that the cryptographic proof of the timestamp
chronology is designed to provide, state regulation of cryptocurrency payments
transaction-execution should include protections of these types. This is because
the instructions sent by the initiator of a crypto-payment to an intermediary
payment provider may not involve all of the proof and timestamp features
required for this level of protection. We say that they may not protect the
intermediary or the initiator sufficiently because wallets and exchanges have
reported the loss of cryptocurrencies. 377
Regulation E's remittance transfer rules also establish rules for errorresolution and call for providers to investigate and resolve claimed errors if the
consumer sender has made his or her claim within 180 days of the promised
date of delivery of the payment. 378 The error-resolution procedures apply to the
three types of errors specified in section 1005.33(a)(1): incorrect amount paid
to the recipient, failure to make the funds available to the recipient on the date
stated on the receipt given to the consumer sender of the payment in the United
States, and provider errors that result in the payment being sent to the wrong
recipient.
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U.C.C. Article 4A provides rules for the unenforceability of certain
verified payment orders, 380 and rules governing refunds of payments and
imposing a duty on the customer to report unauthorized payment orders. 381
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Rules comparable to these Article 4A rules would be suitable for non-consumer
initiators of payments instructions.
E. Miscellaneous Issues Arisingfrom Custom or Otherwisefrom Article 4A
A few miscellaneous provisions that come from custom or from U.C.C.
Article 4A could be considered. Examples of such provisions include:
(1) Notices to initiators and recipients. For example, beneficiaries in
Article 4A transactions get "advice of credit" notices from the bank that serves
as their depository bank. Advices of credit inform beneficiaries that the bank
has "accepted" a "payment order" intended for their accounts; because
"acceptance" makes the fund transfer final as to a particular beneficiary. This is
the last event in the chain of transfers needed to move funds from the originator
to the beneficiary's bank. Advices, thus, reflect final payments and discharge
any underlying obligation of the originator to pay the beneficiary. The initiator
of a cryptocurrency payment may need to get a notice of receipt or other form
of receipt from the wallet or exchange operator who serves as the intermediary.
(2) Rules governing special issues when creditor process is served on the
recipient's agent3 82 and agents' rights of setoff against credits to the recipient's
account with the agent (for example, for payment instructions made by the
same customer or for fees owed by the customer to the agent).
Inclusion of a
rule similar to section 4A-502(d) that limits the effect of service of creditor
process to service on the recipient's agent in the particular crypto-payment
transaction should be considered. 384 Of course, in a crypto-payment transaction,
the exchange operator is likely to be able to receive the payment instruction
from the initiator and credit the account of the recipient, but we envision a
stage in the progress of crypto-payments in which multiple intermediary wallets
or exchange operators might be engaged in completing a single payment
instruction through to the recipient.
Conclusion
This article has described what cryptocurrencies are, how cryptocurrencies
are distinct in our view from "virtual currencies," and what efforts to regulate
them so far have produced both here and abroad. It also has reviewed publiclaw regulatory models - for purposes such as deterring and detecting money
laundering or violations of economic sanctions, collecting taxes and identifying
those avoiding taxes, regulation of the issuance of securities and of those who
trade in them as a business, and regulation of commodities and those who trade
in them as a business-that, so far, seem to be the predominant models abroad.
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We have suggested that some of these models also serve to enhance markets
and may even offer some private-facing provisions that replace the need for
dickered contracts. We have identified provisions of the New York State
BitLicense Final Regulation that, as a case study of licensure and prudential
regulation regimes for cryptocurrencies, may not represent the rules that other
States are likely to adopt. We have looked beyond the steps taken to seek the
last link in a more robust and mature complex of regulations for cryptocurrency
payments transactions conducted by intermediaries.
It is clear that New York State's 2015 BitLicense Regulation385 and its
2014 BitLicense Proposal,386 and the reports from the Conference of State Bank
Supervisor's Emerging Payments Task Force 387 and the Final Study Committee
on Alternative and Mobile Payments3 88 have fundamentally changed the debate
about cryptocurrency regulation. Although a few ideological partisans may
hold out, the consensus view is shifting from a discussion of whether
cryptocurrency should be regulated to more pointed questions regarding when,
how and by whom such actions should be taken.389
The movement to a more interventionist approach by governments is in
part a reaction to two class action lawsuits in the United States,390 the January
2015 hacking of Bitstamp's online storage depository39 1 and the Mt. Gox
bankruptcy proceedings in Japan 392 and ancillary Chapter 15 action in Texas. 393
As it appears that reluctance to regulate cryptocurrencies has been
overcome at both the State and Federal levels, as evidenced by the BitLicense
Final Regulation and the work of the CSBS and ULC, we have proposed that
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now is the time to begin writing a commercial law that would regulate the
rights and duties of counterparties to the transfers of cryptocurrency
transactions - those engaged in "money transmission" as FinCEN has defined
it. That said, we think that other applications of the distributed computing
technology that underlies cryptocurrencies - such as using the block chain to
manage intangibles like mortgages - are not ripe for regulation at this time.
We have suggested a framework for the commercial law we believe is
needed. We built our framework on Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial
Code because it offers the closest analogy to rules for multi-party transfers of
credits in the United States. Minor variations, which we have suggested above,
may be needed to make an Article 4A model such as we propose work for
cryptocurrency payments intermediaries. In Part IV of this article, we have
suggested topics for inclusion in a commercial law for cryptocurrency
payments intermediaries that are found in other payments and e-payments
commercial or consumer protection laws. These include error-resolution, rules
regulating redemption of value by persons who deliver value into the custody
of others, and rules establishing the liabilities of counterparties to each other.
We have not suggested where this new commercial law should be housed - that
is, whether a new subpart of Article 4A or a new model or uniform law outside
the Uniform Commercial Code should emerge to deal with cryptocurrency
payment intermediaries' business dealing on behalf of others. We remain
persuaded that Article 4A offers useful points of comparison with legacy
systems and may enhance opportunities for new entrants and legacy providers
to innovate.
In connection with our proposal, we also attempted to observe the
following principles:
(1) Cryptocurrency providers should be regulated by the agency, whether
of the federal or state governments, with the most experience
supervising similar entities for similar purposes. In the United States,
for example, for prudential purposes and for private-law purposes
related to transaction execution, state regulators with the greatest
familiarity with non-depository supervision and private law regulation
of transaction execution should take the lead. Other public-law
purposes such as taxation, securities registration and broker-dealer
conduct, commodities trading and dealer transactions, deterrence of
money laundering and of terrorist finance, and enforcement of
economic sanctions regimes seem more properly the province of the
federal government.
(2) Regulation should be designed to increase comfort levels for market
participants that, we suggest, will spur earlier and more widespread
adoption of regulated technologies. This trust or trusted entity factor
should not be overlooked in debate about regulating cryptocurrency
payment intermediaries.
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(3) Clarity in the scope of regulations and guidance is essential. Clarity
that exposes loopholes that innovators can exploit is not bad in itself.
The exploitation of loopholes is in the nature of innovation in
financial services and financial services technologies.
(4) A risk-based approach, such as U.C.C. Article 4A, is more likely to
allow innovation than a prescriptive approach such as the BitLicense
Final Regulation. Risk-based regulation also may reduce the need for
frequent revisions to regulations that are costly for all market
participants. A final benefit of a risk-based approach is that it can suit
specific applications - with greater and lesser risks - better than a
prescriptive, one-size-fits-all approach, and, accordingly, can lower
costs while preserving the allocations of rights and responsibilities
intended.
We believe that these principles are suitable to guide other forms of future
regulation of cryptocurrencies and the persons that use or trade in them.
The different potential uses of the algorithms underlying Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies make the task of getting their early regulation right all the
more important. But as the potential exists for more uses of cryptocurrencies in
payments transactions, it is important that we begin to draft a basic scheme for
regulating the obligations of the parties to such transactions - initiators, and
particularly all classes of intermediaries including wallet providers, exchanges
and other service providers. We also recommend that it be developed at
roughly the same time as prudential regulation of those offering payments
execution and value-storage services. Finally, we encourage that both a
commercial law and prudential regulations be adopted soon enough to allow
these payment options to flourish.
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